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ABSTRACT
POLITICAL COMMUNITY AND INDIVIDUAL GAINARISTOTLE, ADAM SMITH AND THE PROBLEM OF EXCHANGE

SEPTEMBER 2002
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As the central expression of the principle of
justice,

the idea of exchange has deep roots in the

classical Greek

constitution of political community.

In the writings of Aristotle,

the just material

transaction is crucial to the constitution of political
community.

Aristotle's analysis of exchange in the

Nichomachean Ethics and the Politics attempts to
investigate the ways in which exchange can be rendered
in accordance with the principle of justice as an

equalizing reciprocity.

However,

as

I

show in the

first chapter of this work, Aristotle's treatment of

exchange in the Ethics does not succeed in creating
formula for equivalency.

Nor,

in the subsequent

attempt to approach the issue of exchange in the
Politics,

is Aristotle able to decisively separate

transgressive and unequal modes of exchange from

beneficial and fair ones.
IV

In the end,

as

I

argue,

a

Aristotle has discovered an
aporia pointing to the
fundamental ambiguity of exchange
one which points,
moreover, to a troubling
ambiguity with regard

-

to the

nature of the bonds maintaining
the polis.
The second chapter explores
Mercantilist and
Physiocratic attempts to solves the
problem of the
excessive remainder of exchange.
The resolution of
Aristotle’s aporia as I argue in
the third chapter, is
found in the Adam Smith's Wealth
of Nations.
Smith's
epochal work endures less for its
formal analytical
,

contributions than for the ideological
content it
offers to market economics. My argument
is,

in

essence, that the ideological portion
of the Wealth of

Nations is premised on

a

characterization of exchange

as qualitative and distributive.

exchange effects

a

This positing of

turn on the Aristotelian treatment

of beneficial and/or non-transgressive
exchange forms
in order to repress the quantitative issue
of exchange-

value and the attendant issue of individual profit.
The suspension of quantitativity is not only necessary
to the supression of profit
a

—

but serves to formulate

new characterization of exchange

in which the

exchange transaction as disassociated from the
trappings of quantitativity now becomes

a

source for

ideological or "meta-economic" appropriations.

v

PREFACE

Material exchange presents

a

problem to theory.

Because exchange does not and
can not effect a precise
substitution
similitude of objects transacted
would
wholly negate the need for the
activity
an essential
dissimilitude between exchangeable
objects is reguisite
to any transaction.
In the literature of the
classical
Greeks, two competing representations
of material

-

-

exchange evince this difficulty.

In some instances,

the concept of economic exchange
is cast as necessary,

natural and mutual, performing the
reciprocal function
of provisioning and distributing
goods.
In a second
sense, exchange is presented as an
adventitious

phenomenon which produces unfair gain -and as such,
is a subversion of the bonds necessary
to political
community.
The goal of this inquiry is to trace the

reverberations and implications of this classical

problem in the modern epoch; an epoch marked by the
transmogrification, both formally and ideologically, of
the paradox of exchange.

vi
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INTRODUCTION

To exchange gold for
silver,

so tha t no
man... did take no profit
from making
such exchange.
Chaucer
•

here is nothing which requires
more to
be illustrated by philosophy
than
trade.

Samuel Johnson

The concept of exchange has roots
in the classical
Greek idea of justice, dike , a harmonious
association

m

which the law of measure is observed
or enacted.
a law of measure, dike provides
a corrective which
counters disorder, a corrective enacted through
reparation.

1

As

According to the cosmology of

Anaximander, nature functions as

a

self-regulating

equilibrium, and the settlement of justice entails

compensation through which the naturally opposed
elements
{dike)

(

stoicheia

are required to make reparations

to one another for their transgressions of the

order of the kosmos as they engage the process of

On early forms of Greek justice see Eric Havelock,
The Greek Concept of Justice : From Its Shadow in Homer
To Its Substance in Plato (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1978)
1

1

genesis-phthora. 2

To "get justice" is literally
to

"get the equal"

(isa essetai)

(diken didonai)

is literally "to pay the
equal." 1

and to "give justice"
As

Gregory Vlastos notes, the words
ameibo, allasso,
antapeibomai , antallasso, amoibe
apodosis, antapodosis
,
all apply to the "closure of a
commercial transaction"
as well as to "the satisfaction
of justice."'

As a

pattern of thought applied to "physical
sequences where
one event was regularly followed by
(and thus

As Kimon Lycos writes, "It is important to
realize
operates in a context which suggests a
cyclical process, a process of natural regeneration.
Disturbances' of what is apportioned have the role
regenerating an order. Analogously, man, god, and of
everything else, have a place in the order of 'honour'
(time) established by moira.
The essence of justice is
to deal with others in accordance with that
order, not
to encroach upon it."
Plato on Justice and Power.
[London: Macmillan Press, 1987], p. 178, nt. 42).
Cf.
Parminedes, Frag. 1. 13—4 and Frag. 8. 36-8; and
Heraclitus, Frag. 94.
For a useful sketch of
Anaximander, see W.K.C. Guthrie, A History of Greek
Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1962)
Also see Leon Robin, Greek Thought (New York:
Knopf, 1928) and especially C.H. Kahn, Anaximander and
the Origins of Greek Cosmology (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1960)
^
here that dike

(

.

3

See for example,

Odyssey,

ii.

203.

4
Gregory Vlastos, "Equality and Justice in Early
Greek Cosmologies," Classical Philology 41-6 (1947),

pp.

173-174,

nt.

158.
2

"exchanged for") its reciprocal,”
this reciprocity is
enacted through substitution
a standing-in of
one
element for another. 5

-

However, as dispensed by the
Gods, the early forms
of dike were largely arbitrary
actions, and as a
consequence, justice was not fully
intelligible to
human understanding.* As Werner
Jaeger has argued, it
is the poet statesman Solon
who is responsible for

reappropriating the idea of justice
from its
cosmological and theological sources
and establishing
it as a comprehensive and
comprehensible political

"

the cycle of birth

^d

death

(Phaedo
/2b); waking and sleeping
Phaedo 72b); the
secession of day and night (e.g. Hesiod,
Theog. 749)-

71e

(

the cycle of the seasons (Philo De
incorr. mundi 109)*
h
bribe the g^und in turn (Pindar, Pyth.
f
Vlastos n °tes, "scientific thought used 4.
this
pattern to join events which had either
been left
unconnected (like evaporation and precipitation
(Aris
Meteor 355a28) or else had not been clearly
grasped^s
strict equations by the popular mind (like
breathing in
and breathing. out [Plato Tim. 79e7-8; or the
stretching
of a lyre string and the vibration when
released
[Aris. Mech. prob. 803a31]).
But the uniformity of
nature as a whole could also be construed as just
such
a reciprocity among its basic components."
("Equality
and Justice in Early Greek Cosmologies,"
pp. 173 - 174
nt
158).

^Vf

,

.

6
The unintelligibility of the notion of dike is
further explained by the fact that it was bound up with
the belief in fate {moira )
which is also linked to the
reigning principles of rightful share or just
proportion (aisa), thus operating, as Vlastos notes,
"on the assumption that what is fated is to be
'approximate' or of the 'right order'." ("Equality and
Justice in Early Greek Cosmologies," pp. 160-1). Cf.
W.C. Greene, Moira , Fate, Good and Evil in Greek
Thought (New York: Harper and Row Torchbooks, 1963)
.

3

order; that is, as an observable
social consequence of
human (trans) action.’ This
rationalization8
of dike is essential to Solon's
Eunomie (literally,

"right order")

in response to the contemporary
crisis

of political and social disorder

(stasis )

The shift from a theological or
cosmological dike
to one conditioned solely by the
affairs of humans is

7

historically confluent with the emergence
of coinage as
a means to regulate material
transactions
in human

communities now understood expressly as
political

associations

.

The money form supports the new
idea of

See Jaeger's "Solon: Creator of Athenian
Political
Ure
Paideia: The ideals of Greek Culture vol.
?
v
I
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1945)
Also see
A. French, "The Economic Background
to Solon's
Reform S ," T he Classical Quarterly, n.s.
6, nos. 1,2
(lyhb), pp. 69 85.
Such a rationalizing impulse was
also being carried out in cosmological theories.
Vlastos notes that Empedocles "rationalizes aisa
exactly as Parmenides ...rationalized moira, and
Anaximander chreon (fateful necessity)." ("Equality and
Justice in Early Greek Cosmologies," pp. 173-174, nt.
U

^

m

,

.

158)

.

8
In Hesiod's Theogony, Eunomia is the Sister of
Dike.
On stasis see G.E.M. De Ste. Croix, The Class Struggle
in the Ancient World (London: Duckworth, 1981) and M.I.
Finley, "Athenian Demagogues" in Studies in Ancient
Society ed. M.I. Finley (London: Routledge, Kegan &
Paul, 1971), pp. 5-6, and attendant references.
See
also M.M. Austin and P. Vidal-Naquet, Economic and
Social History of Ancient Greece (Berkeley: University
of California Press, 1977)
,

See Michael Rostovtzeff, The Social and Economic
9
History of the Hellenistic World (Oxford: Clarendon
_

Press, 1941) and Karl Polanyi, "The Semantics of MoneyUses," in Primitive, Archaic and Modern Economies
(Garden City, N.Y. Anchor Books, 1968)
4

the citizen,

as based upon an understanding
of a

similarity among members; they
are homoimoi, "men who
are alike." 10 As Vernant writes,
the issuing of money
with the seal of the city served
as a means for
...codifying, regulating and coordinating
the
exchange of goods and services among
citizens
according to an exact numerical
valuation
ectual leve1 for the old im *ge
of
i
ealth as hhybns
-- so charged with
affective
force
legal tender substituted for the
abstract
idea of nomisma, a social standard
of value a
rational contrivance that allowed for
a
measure of diverse realities, and thus common
equalized
exchange as a social relationship. 11

^

'

The promise of equality and commonality
marking
the confluence between money and the ends
of the polis

was not, however,

to be fully enacted in practice.

I

suggest that this imprecision forms one element
of

Gregory Vlastos’ observation that although political
justice was drawn by Solon as

a

self-regulating social

process, distributive justice, the justice governing

10
Vernant writes, "On the political level the
citizens conceived of themselves as interchangeable
units within a system whose law was the balance of
power and whose norm was equality." (The Origins of
Greek Thought, p. 61)
11
Vernant, The Origins of Greek Thought, p. 95.
Vernant attributes this argument to E. Will,
Korinthiaka: Recherches sur l'histoire et la
civilisation de Corinthe des origens aux guerres
mediques (Paris, 1955), pp. 495-502. (See Vernant,
Origins of Greek Thought, p. 94, nt 10 for other
citations)
.

5

The

acquisition,

"lagged behind" the justice of
the polls;

essentially, no "immediate reparation
existed to
regulate the acquisition and the
process of wealth." 12
In its most subtle form,

this issue of

distributive justice hinges on the
paradoxical nature
of the exchange relation: it is
voluntary and
transactive, yet, as such, it never
performs

"substitution."

a

perfect

Well past the epochs of lawless

usurpation of property which occupied earlier
writers
such as Hesiod, the pivotal material issue
at stake for

Aristotle's reflections on the polls is the
relation
between citizens as refracted through the fair

exchange

of goods and coinage -- the extension of
the central

principle of justice, Isonomla, to quotidian
material
transactions

13

Although Aristotle's treatment of exchange is

widely dispersed within

a

diverse secondary literature,

12
Vlastos, "Solonian Justice," Classical Philology
XLV (April 1946), pp. 75-77. Vlastos also refers us to
Maurice Croiset's discussion in "La Morale et ,1a cite
dans les poesies de Solon," Compt. rend. Acad. Inscrlp.
et Belles-Lettres
(Paris: 1903).
13
The "wealth-getting" which concerns Aristotle is
thus not that of the kind which exists between the
propertied citizens who extract surplus through the
use of slave labor or debt-bondage, but the sort which
emphasizes the economic interaction been equals, that
is, between citizens.
On slavery in the classical
Greek world, see M.I. Finley, Slavery and Classical
Antiquity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,

1968)
6

the issue makes its most
sustained appearance in a
debate which contains significant
claims regarding the
relation between, and subsequently
the respective

characteristics of, classical Greek
and modern
economics.
The ground of this controversy
was laid in
the 1860's in the work of Karl
Rodbertus, who

set out a

theorem which was to be the grist
of

a

debate engaged

some thirty years later by Karl
Buchner and Eduard
Meyer over the degree of development
in the ancient
Greek economy.
Following Buchner,
1

'

the

substantivists or "primitivists" assert

a

radical

disparity between the economies of antiquity
and
modernity, arguing that because for the

ancients,

economic behavior was embedded in non-economic
aspects
of life,

it was therefore determined by cultural

practices and not by maximizing decisions. 15

For

For a good summary of the early forms of the
debate
see Harry W. Pearson, "The Secular Debate on
Economic
Primitivism in Trade and Market in Early Empires Karl
Polanyi, Conrad M. Arensberg and Harry w. Pearson,
eds
(Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1957).
See also Percy S.
Cohen, "Economic Analysis and Economic Man: Some
Comments on a Controversy, " in Themes in Economic
Anthropology, ed. Raymond W. Firth (London: Tavistock,
1967)
pp 91-118; Scott Meikle, "The Ancient 'Economy'
and its Literature," in Aristotle's Economic Thought
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995) ; and the bibliography
in M.I. Rostovtzef f Social and Economic History of the
Hellenistic World III (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1941)
pp. 1327-28, nt
25.
14

,

.

,

,

.

15
The separateness of the economy finds one of its
earliest modern expressions expression in Hegel's
Philosophy of Right. The distinction between embedded
and disembedded economies may be likewise compared also
7

Buchner and his followers, this
distinction marks both
a critical divergence
between ancient and modern
economic modes as well as the
inapplicability of modern
analysis to ancient economic modes.
The moderns,

to
the contrary, assert that no
such radical divergence in
terms of economic practice exists
between the two
epochs. As M. Rostovtzef phrases
it, "modern
f

capitalistic development... differs from
the ancient
only in quantity and not in quality";
according to the
moderns, modern economic theory is
consequently
applicable to the study of ancient
economies. 16
to Ferdinand Toennies' Gemeinschaft
and Gesellschaft
^Co^unity and Association [London: Routledge,
Keegan

s

Urkhe m s mechanica l and organic
solidar?tv (The Division
n
i Labor in
solidarity
of
Society [New York
Free Press]) and Henry Sumner Maine's
status
contract Ancient Law [Boston: Beacon Press and
Most recently this notion is associated with 1963]
Polanyi. {"Aristotle Discovers the Economy," Karl
in Karl
Polanyi, Conrad M. Arensberg and Harry W.
Pearson
I
Market in Early EmP ir es [Chicago: 'Henry
Regneryf 1957] f
le

•

(

)

i

16 M Rostovtzef f cited in J.H. D'Arms,
Commerce
Social Standing in Ancient Rome (Cambridge: Harvardand
Press 1981), p. 12. Also see Scott Cook,
s Obsolete
Anti - Market' Mentality: A Critigue of
the Substantive Approach to Economic Anthropology "
American Anthropologist, April 1966, pp. 323-45.
Economic historians associated with this position have
in some cases aligned Aristotle's work with central
tenets of the nineteenth-century neo-classical
revolution in economic thought which poses subjective
preference as the hinge of economic analysis. See for
example, Emil Kauder, ("Genesis of Marginal Utility
Theory," Economic Journal 63 [1953], pp. 638-50); and
Joseph Soudek ("Aristotle's Theory of Exchange: An
Inquiry into the Origin of Economic Analysis,"
Proceedings of the American Philosophy Society 96
[1952
pp 45-75)
'

]

,

.

8

The treatment of Aristotle
by both the

pnmitivists and the moderns
instances, problematic.

is,

in several key

The primitivists,

m

for example,

posing Aristotle as an exemplary
representative of
the embedded economy, present
a picture of exchange
which is organized around needs,
use-values
and the

household (oikos)

However,

to read Aristotle

'

s

approach to economic matters primarily
through the
principles of simple necessity and
use-value serve to
over-simplify the enigmatic relation of
wealth to the
polis, which as Aristotle recognized,
is an entity
which requires certain forms of material
superfluity in
order to free its members from the constraints

associated with mere physical life (zoe). 17
I7
a reading of Aristotle extends well
beyond
primitive/modern debate. One of the more extensive the
versions is found in a work by Eric Havelock which
claims to have uncovered a Greek "liberal" tradition
which has been overwhelmed by the canonical emphasis
on
Plato and Aristotle: "For Plato, as for Aristotle,
the
developed commercial community, which is well enough
organized to produce a surplus for at least part of its
population to enjoy, represented a condition of social
disaffection or abnormality." (T he Liberal Temper in
Greek Politics [London: Jonathan Cape, 1957], p. 384).
According to Havelock, Democritus, Protagorus, Antiphon
and their fourth-century successors represent a nonPlatonic tradition of thought built on the
"anthropologies of the pre-Socratic" (the vestiges of
the latter found in Aeschylus, Sophocles and
Euripides)
"What is at least clear is that the
liberals envisaged the production of material wealth as
a proper goal of community, and that they could
abstract goods and services as a significant factor in
human life and that they traced a parallel between
increasing integration in community and increasing
production of wealth." (p. 386.)
To assert the
.

:

9

Furthermore, as suggested above, in
the polls money,
the expression of exchange-value,
performs a critical

public function as

a

mediating standard

—

a

function

which is widely neglected by analyses
which focus on
the oikos.
As for the claims of the modernists,
a more
fundamental problem exists.
The application of modern
theories of investment, banking and
economic policy
to

ancient society belies an acute insensitivity
to
18
historical evidence.
Despite the abundance
of

empirical and conceptual criticism, the most
serious of
which issuing from the work of Max Weber,
Johannes

Hasebroek and Moses
yet persists.

I.

Finely,

5

"

the modernist stance

That despite all, this controversy

"refuses to lie down," 20 is due to the sizable
stakes

argument as not concerning simply wealth but unlimited
wealth would shift Havelock's position onto more
productive and accurate territory. As it is, Barry
Gordon agrees that Havelock's strictures concerning
Aristotle are too severe. ("Aristotle and Hesiod: The
Economic Problem in Greek Thought, " .Review of Social
Economy 21 [1963], p. 152).
18
This insensitivity extends to the most fundamental
usages of terms; for example, even the word "economy"
must be regarded with great caution when used in the
classical Greek context as there is no direct
equivalent for the term in modern English usage
oikonomike was used principally in the sense of the art
of household management or the management of a city.
See especially Kurt Singer, "Oikonomia: The Origins of
Economic Thought and Language," Kyklos 11 (1958).

—

19

See Finley,

"Aristotle and Economic Analysis."

20
P. Millet, Lending and Borrowing in Ancient Athens
(Cambridge: Oxford University Press, 1991), pp. 9 and

10

which lie at the source of the
contention. These
stakes involve the struggle over
the definitive
representation of modern market

economies: on the one

hand,

as a trajectory reflecting
a "natural" or

organic” socio-historic process, or,
on the other
hand, understood as a politico-social
phenomenon
unprecedented in human history. 21
As symptoms of a much larger
ideological battle,
the issues governing the primitivist/modern
debate
erupt in varying forms in the broader
discourses of

Scott Meikle suggests that "Markets existed
in
societies of many kinds for millennia without
those
societies being or becoming market economies
A
society can become entirely regulated by
exchange-value
distinction between production and circulation of
exchange values versus capital system only if
there is
a market in capital, and that in turn is
possible only
when there is a serious market in labor, that is,
when
labour is generally supplied in the form of an
exchange-value (labour capacity or ’labour power')
which capital can buy.
These are the defining
conditions of a market economy, and neither condition
was obtained in the ancient world. Virtually all
lending was eranos lending, and, as Millett notes, a
survey of the known motives behind eranos or 'friendly'
loans reveals no instance of a productive outcome."
{Aristotle’ s Economic Thought [Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1995], pp. 162-3).
The authors claiming an
Aristotelian heritage for the market include: J. Soudek
(Aristotle's Theory of Exchange: an Enquiry into the
Origin of Economic Analysis," Proceedings of the
American Philosophical Society, 96 [1952], pp. 45-75);
W.F.R. Hardie Aristotle’s Ethical Theory [Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1968], pp. 191-201); Barry J. Gordon
("Aristotle and the Development of Value Theory,"
Quarterly Journal of Economics 78 [1964], pp. 115-28),
("Aristotle and Hesiod: The Economic Problem in Greek
Thought," Review of Social Economy 21 [1963], pp. 14756); and S. Todd Lowry (The Archeology of Economic
Ideas [Durham: Duke University Press, 1987]).
21

(

11

market economics, particularly those
espousing
fundamentalist laissez-faire values.
The authority
most commonly invoked in such polemics
is

that if the

author widely regarded as the architect
of the modern
free-market economic system, Adam Smith.
Smith's
Wealth of Nations remains a pivotal
resource for

ideological provisions which continue to
robustly

underpin the ethos of the ever-expanding
scope of the
late-modern market economy. 22 As Gregory Lukacs
has

phrased it, Smith is responsible for some of
the "great
scientific pronouncements of the bourgeois class." 23

M y approach to Smith is organized around what
appears to be a fundamental division in the Wealth
of

Nations

a

division organized around the introduction

of the price mechanism in the sixth chapter of
Book

I.

The first portion of the Wealth carries the bulk of
the

aphoristic material, including assertions which have
been characterized by some commentators as

This expansion occurs in two forms: within
established market economies in which the market ethos
is extended into spheres previously outside the reach
of market forces such as health care, education and the
human services; and secondly, the geographical
expansion of advanced market forms ("globalization")
With regard to the ideas broadly associated with neoliberal attributes of market economies, I use the word
"ideology" polemically.
22

23
Lukacs, History and Class Consciousness trans.
Livingston (London: Merlin Press, 1971), p. 225.
,

12

R.

"metaphysical

whereas the remainder of the
work
addresses the topic largely in
terms of more empirical
economic phenomena
prices of wheat, trade treaties
and taxes, although such
topics as education and
religious instruction are also
included.
Because the
first portion of the work
establishes, as it were
the ideological prologue for
the more properly economic
argument, the reader is presented
with a highly

—

freighted narrative.
The first portion of the work
is commonly

understood to be propelled by Smith’s
assertion of the
division of labor as the sole source for
a

collective wealth,

a

"universal opulence."

greater
I

will

argue that the pervasive elements conditioning
this
chapter address the classical paradigm of
economic gain
as a zero-sum.

Propelled by the productive capacity of the

division of labor. Smith's argument runs alongside
very selective representation of exchange.

a

The object

24
The term is Louis Dumont's, who makes the point
with regard to Smith's assertion in chapter five that
value consists in labour and only labour can measure
it."
From Mandeville to Marx: The Genesis and Triumph
of Economic Ideology [Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1977], pp. 88 and passim)
Also see Dumont's
comments on the relation between chapter five, six and
seven of Book I of the Wealth of Nations as well as
Gunnar Myrdal, The Political Element in the Development
of Economic Theory, trans. Paul Streetan (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1955)
(

.

13

of exchange in this first section
is uniformly cast as

provisioning function, which is altogether
liberated
from the accumulation of "wealth"
now shifted to the
division of labor
permitting Smith to avoid all the
tortured deliberations of his forebears
a

—

—

on the subject

of exchange-value.

In the Wealth of Nations

under the

,

aegis of the division of labor, the issue
of unequal
gain is suspended until Smith has recourse
to a form of
individual gain as enacted through his concept
of the

price mechanism, wherein profit becomes part of

a

process outside the immediacy of the single exchange
transaction.

As framed by Aristotle’s analysis of exchange, the
first portion of the Wealth of Nations reveals an

attempt to resolve the issue with which the classical

tradition struggled

namely,

to reconcile individual

pecuniary gain with "common benefit."

Smith’s

presentation of the concept of exchange are especially
compelling insofar as his language, in preparing the
ground for

a

redeemed and legitimated conception of

individual gain, relies upon

a

primitive account of

exchange which often appears to be in conformity with
the most simple demands of the oikos.

14

Here,

exchange

IS portrayed as a distribution
of goods, while "wealth"

does not signify money, but

a

magnitude of useful

material necessities. 25
The conception of exchange which
is contained in
the first portion of the Wealth of
Nations by

emphasizing mutuality to the exclusion
of profit,
provides the central ideological cornerstone

of the

work.

The effort at hand attempts a textual
archeology

of this ideological pivot, pursuing
the sources of what

Marx has referred to as the "sphere of
circulation"
which mystically renders each transaction

equal, while

contributing to what has been referred to by Elie
Halevy as the doctrine of the mutuality of interests. 26
Smith makes three direct references to Aristotle in
the Wealth of Nations, none of which deal with the
discussion of exchange in the Politics or the Ethics.
Meikle speculates that the references, which deal with
historical or political events, seem to have originated
not from a direct study of Aristotle, but from Smith's
familiarity with Pufendorf and Montesquieu.
(Aristotle's Economic Thought, p. 110)
For a reading
of Smith which places him in the context of early Greek
thought, see Vernard Foley, The Social Physics of Adam
Smith (West Lafayette, Indiana: Purdue University
Press, 1976)
25

,

.

.

Karl Marx, Capital, vol I (New York: International
Publishers, 1967); Elie Halevy, The Growth of
Philosophic Radicalism , vol. Ill (London: Faber &
Faber, 1928)
As Marx writes, "This sphere (of
circulation) ... is in fact a very Eden of the innate
rights of man.
There alone rule Freedom, Equality,
Property and Bentham.
Freedom, because both buyer and
seller of a commodity, say of labour-power, are
constrained only by their own free will. They contract
as free agents, and the agreement they come to, is but
the form in which they give legal expression to their
common will. Equality, because each enter into
26

.

.
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Although the significance of the Wealth
of Nations is
widely argued to be the way in which
Smith

synthesizes

series of disparate economic principles
into what was
at the time the most comprehensive
analytical
a

representation of the nascent free market
economy, 27 I
will suggest that the most enduring
contribution of
Smith lies, rather, in the way in which
he displaced
the formerly intractable issue of individual
monetary

gain while "solving"

hand

—

if by a primitive slight of

the problems associated with exchange and

rendering it as an iconic linchpin of the modern
market
economy.

relation with the other, as with a simple owner of
commodities, and they exchange equivalent for
equivalent.
Property, because each only disposes of
what is his own. And Bentham, because each only looks
to himself."
Capital vol. I, p. 176).
(

,

27
Jacob Viner, "Adam Smith, " International
Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences (1968)
Reprinted
in J.C. Wood, ed., Adam Smith: Critical Assessments
(London: Croom Helm, 1984).
For a more critical
approach to the scope and magnitude of Smith's
analytical contributions see Salim Rashid, The Myth of
Adam Smith (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 1998)
16

CHAPTER

I

THE PROBLEM OF EXCHANGE IN
CLASSICAL GREEK THOUGHT
J t is by taking part in
transactions
with our fellow men that some of
us
become just and others unjust.

Aristotle 28

A. Aristotle:

The Nichomachean Ethics 29

Aristotle's notion of "particular justice" 30
as
conditioned by the imperative of "having one's
own"

auton)

]

,

and defined as "the equal"

(to ison)

i2

(ta

signals

28
Nichomachean Ethics trans. H. Rackham (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1934), 1103bl6. Hereafter
referred to as the Ethics.
,

29
The Nichomachean Ethics and the Eudemian Ethics
have three books in common, the book of our central
concern in the Nichomachean Ethics book five, being
nearly identical to the fourth book of the Eudemian
Ethics.
For an account of the relationship between the
two works, see A.J.P. Kenny, The Aristotelian Ethics: A
Study of the Relationship Between the Eudemian and
Nichomachean Ethics of Aristotle (Oxford: Clarendon

Press,

1978)

.

30
Aristotle's division of justice into two
categories, "universal" and "particular" marks a shift
from the unified Platonic notion. As Ernest Barker
notes, "while Plato's formula is that each individual
should do his own, Aristotle's formula is that each
individual should have his own." (The Political Thought
of Plato and Aristotle [New York: Russell & Russell,

1959]

,

p.

340,

31
Aristotle,
35.

nt.

1)

Ethics

,

1133b6-12,

17

1132a29-36,

1134a32-

the importance of the exchange
relation.

Particular

justice is divided by Aristotle into
three categories:
corrective justice, or diorthorikos
literally meaning
"straightening out," and entails the
restoration of
equality occurring in either voluntary
or involuntary
private transactions [synallegmata]
transactions of
;

the former kind include sales,

and leases.

J

loans,

deposits, pledges

Early in his discussion of corrective

32
n eS
otherwise noted, the translation to be
used
.u i
is +that
of? Martin Ostwald's Nichomachean

Ethics
(Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1962). As Gregory
Vlastos notes, "The linguistic bond of justice
equality was even closer for the Greeks than it with
is for
us: to ison, isotes, would be the very
words to which
they would turn for a natural, unstrained,
one-word
variant, for to dikaion, diaiosuon."
("Theory of
Social Justice, " in Helen North ed., Interpretations
of
Plato [Leiden, The Netherlands: E.J. Brill,
1977], pp
18-19)
As Michael De Goyer writes, "At its deepest
level, the fundamental difficulty repeatedly posed
in
Aristotle’s treatment of justice resides in the fact
that the words justice and equality constituted direct
synonyms." ("The Marxian Matrix," in Marx and
Aristotle : Nineteenth Century German Social Theory and
Classical Antiquity [Savage, Maryland: Roman &
Littlefield, 1992], p. 130).
.

.

33
These are generally private transactions, but in
some instances the injured party is a public official
Ethics 1132b23-30) or the polis itself Ethics
1138al2-14)
Involuntary transactions, on the other
hand, are in some instances clandestine, as theft,
adultery, poisoning or assassination. Others occur
under constraint as assault, imprisonment, murder,
violent robbery, maiming or defamation. Ethics
1131a3-9)
It is well to note that the secondary
literature is not unanimous on the usage of
synallegmata as rendering transaction in the sense of
contract or exchange. Ross and Barker are among the
majority in the former instance, while J. Burnett and
A. Grants adduce corrective justice to be governing
rightful exchange transactions as well as giving
redress for unjust ones. With regard to voluntary and
(

,

(

.

(

.

18

,

justice, Aristotle establishes the
parameters of the

problem in terms of an exchange transaction.

As he

writes.
the terms loss
zepia and gain kerdos in these
cases come from voluntary exchange.
To
more than what was one's own (previously)possess
is called
making a gain', and to have less than one
started
out with is called 'incurring a loss’ in
buying
selling, and all other transactions
(synallagmata) sanctioned by law.... 34
(

(

He continues:

But when neither party has more or less but exactly
what they contributed to the transaction, they say
they 'have their own' (t a auton without loss or
without gain. 35
)

Aristotle tells us that in order for "the mean between
profit and loss" to be established, 36
"gain" incurred must be measurable. 37

the "loss" and

Given that this

condition is met, the symmetrical structure of exchange

may enact an immanent means of measure: one simply
measures the pre-transaction amount against that of the

involuntary acts, see H.H. Joachim's commentary on the
Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1951), pp.
136-7.
34

Aristotle, Ethics,

1132bl2-17

35

Aristotle, Ethics,

1132b21-23

36

Aristotle, Ethics, 1132al7-19

37

Aristotle, Ethics, 1132al0-15
19

post transaction.'"

Summarily, imbalance is revealed

by the symmetrical shape of the
modality as itself an
expression of isonomia 39 Through transactive
.

reflexivity the exchange modality thus
establishes
matrix which expresses the criteria of

a

the "just."

Despite his early acknowledgement of the

inapplicability of such precise "arithmetical"
restitution to all forms of corrective justice,
lure of an exactitude of calculability,

a

40

the

precision

which permits the judge to "subtract from the
side of

gam

in the defendant’s ledger," is a very
Aristotelian

temptation. 41

This particular calculation of eguality in

transaction is inapplicable en toto to

category of particular justice.

a

second

"Distributive" justice

38
In order to maintain this proportion, it is thus
mandatory that the contravening parties are regarded as
equal: "For it makes no difference whether a good man
has defrauded a bad man or a bad one a good one... the
law looks only at the nature of the damage, treating
the parties as equal, and merely asking whether one has
done and the other has suffered injustice, whether one
inflicted and the other has sustained damage." (Ethics,

1132a2-7)
39
"When the whole has been divided into two halves,
people then say that they ’have their own’
ta auton
having got what is equal." (Ethics, 1132a26-34.
(

)

Aristotle, Ethics, 1132all-12.
For example, in the
"calculation" of compensatory damages in the case of
assault, murder or maiming. (Ethics, 1131a3-9)
40

41

See also Aristotle, Ethics,
20

1131al0-12.

entails the allotment of honor, wealth,
political
position as well as payment misthos
for attending the
assembly and law courts, as based upon
a proportionate
due approximated by one’s contribution
(

to the

community. 42

Aristotle begins his account of

distributive justice by asserting that since
the unjust
man is one who is unfair (anison)
and the unjust
is

,

unequal

{anisou)

,

"it is obvious that there exists a

median term between the two extremes of inequality.
This is the fair or equal."

4
'

As he continues,

In as much as it is a median, it must be
median
between some extremes i.e., between the more and
the less; inasmuch as it is equal, it involves
two
shares that are equal; and inasmuch as it is just,
it must be just for certain parties. Consequently
the just involves at least four terms.... 44

The two quantitative terms

(more and less)

which

informed the account of corrective justice are here
cast by Aristotle as inadequate to the task of

determining equality in distributive justice; an
42
The adjective distributive, dianemetikos, is
associated with the nouns nome and dianome and the
verbs nemein and deanemein, "to distribute."
43
Aristotle, Ethics, 1131al0-13.
Initially
introduced in Book II of the Ethics, the mean (meson)
is a synonym for "moderate" or "of the right amount."
The conception of the mean, rooted in Greek
mathematics,
signifies the middle or middle space in
general. The mean can also indicate a middle term in a
continuous three stage progression, e.g. the mid-point
between extremes.
44

Aristotle, Ethics,

1131al5-21.
21

inadequacy due to the qualitative
differences in merit
between parties which is to govern
distributive
restitution.

m

Equality

distributive justice can not therefore

be arithmetically equal, but rather,

it consists of the

proper analogia, or "equality of ratios"
necessary to
confer offices and rewards according to

the degree of

contribution.’

5

As opposed to the prior instance,
the

factors which determine justice are now
expanded to "at
least' four terms: the two shares involved,
and

the two

people involved.

The rupture from arithmetic

calculation as imposed by the need for analogical

proportion involves the difficulty of establishing
common valuation based on
(&xia)

.

a

a

non-quantitative valuation

As Aristotle writes, although

all are agreed

that "the just share must be given on the basis of what

one deserves,

standard:

46

there is no clear agreement on the

"democrats say free birth, oligarchs that it

is wealth or noble birth,

excellence

and aristocrats that it is

,M7

45

Aristotle, Ethics,

131a29-31.

46

Aristotle, Ethics,

1131a24-25.

47

Aristotle, Ethics,

1

131a25-29
22

Aristotle's discussion of justice
in "commercial"
exchange, chapter five of Book V,
begins the economic
discussion of these issues. « Justice
in commercial

exchange, as Aristotle tells us,
is concerned with
"communities of exchange.'"’ The stakes
with regard to
the political koinonia are immense:
Aristotle tells us
that without fair material exchange
"there
is no

community."-’

Commercial exchange occupies

a

peculiar

position in Aristotle's trajectory of
justice. Unlike

48
The construction of the argument has lead
even
appreciative readers such as James Bonar to refer
to
the chapter as much tortured."
Philosophy and
Political Economy [New York: Augustus M. Kelley
1966]
p. 40)
I will take this opportunity
to
acknowledge my debt to Scott Meikle's careful reading
of Book Five which articulates the importance of
Aristotle s metaphysics to his analysis of exchange.
(

,

.

49
Or "associations based on mutual exchange" (to
antipeponthos kat' analogian
(Ethics, 1132b31-3)
Finley’s translation "les relations d'echange qui ont
pour cadre le communaute" also usefully expands
Rackham's "interchange of services." Nineteenth
century commentators generally treated fair exchange as
merely a division of particular justice. D.G. Ritchie
argues, however, that to treat it is this way is to
diminish its importance, for justice between exchangers
"catallactic justice"
lay at the foundation of
the polis in a way that particular justices did not.
("Aristotle's Subdivisions of Particular Justice"
Classical Review, 7 [1894]). As Meikle, following
Ritchie, suggests, Aristotle holds fair exchange above
other forms of particular justice as it contributes to
the fundamental condition of philia.
Philia, as Meikle
reminds us, is inadequately translated as
"friendship," rather, it is more accurately rendered as
a form of mutuality related to dikaion or fairness.
)

.

—

50

Aristotle, Ethics,

1133bl7-18.
23

the two prior forms of justice,

the justice related to

exchange lies outside of scope of
private suit (dike
ldia)
Commercial exchange occupies a space
.

"where the

law gives immunity," that is,

it does not give

recompense for inequality resulting from
the
"contract

.

Aristotle begins the chapter with
which has the air of

a

rumination:

a

discussion

"Some people believe

with the Pythagoreans that the just in the
unqualified
sense is reciprocity (antipeponthos) ... suffering
that

which one has done to another." 51

literally to "get the equal"
justice"
equal

(

diken didonai
a

To "get justice" is

(isa essetai)

is literally,

and to "give

"to pay the

principle of transaction or exchange found

likewise in the well-known Pythagorean lex talionis,
the "eye for an eye."

Aristotle oscillates between two

positions in this initial section.

As we are told,

Pythagorean reciprocity is often at variance with
corrective or distributive justice, "for there are many
cases in which reciprocity and the just are not

identical"; yet, as Aristotle writes,
even Rhamdamanthys

'

rule of the just in this sense: "If

Aristotle, Ethics
1194a29
51

"people interpret

,

1132b21-24. Cf. Magna Moralia,
24

he suffers what he committed,

then justice will be

straight"- and "people seek either
to requite evil with
evil... or good with good, for
otherwise
there is no

mutual contribution.

53

Aristotle concludes, however,

that with regard to commercial exchange,
the

Pythagorean definition of justice is not
applicable.
As we are told.
the just constitutes the bond that holds
the
association together, that is, reciprocity
in terms
of proportion not in terms of exact
equality in the
return
For it is the reciprocal return of what
is
proportional (to what one has received) that
holds
54
the state together.
The

exact return" to which Aristotle here refers

is thus not a literal recompense

eye." JJ

—

an "eye for an

The problem of equalization which faces

52

Aristotle, Ethics

53

Aristotle, Ethics, 1132b37-1133a2

54

Aristotle, Ethics,

1132b25-28.

1132b32-37.

Meikle translates

as "fair exchange is the salvation of states," which
follows his translation of Politics, 1261a30-31:
"Wherefore the principle of reciprocity
(to ison to
antipenponthos) as I have already remarked in the
Ethics, is the salvation of states." And here is
Ostwald's version of this passage: "The very existence
of the state depends on proportionate reciprocity."
Finally, compare also to Rackham: "But in the
interchange of services Justice in the form of
Reciprocity is the bond that maintains the
association."
(Cf. Magna Moralia 1194al6f)
.

55 As Ostwald notes, "reciprocity antipeponthos
means literally 'suffering in return for one's action'
and comes close to the concepts of 'an eye for an eye'
and 'let the punishment fit the crime." (Ethics, p.
(

123,

nt.

30.)

25

)

Aristotle in this section

is,

rather,

to analogically

render a transitive symmetry
from asymmetry.
To render
the unequal equal (isasthenai)
Aristotle suggests the
deployment of a diagonal combination
of terms. 56 with
this matrix, it may be possible
to create a
,

"reciprocity of proportion" 57 through
an "equality of
proportion" 58 "if (first) proportional
reciprocity is
established between goods, and (second)
reciprocity
effected, the fair exchange .. .will
be realized." 59
What is at stake in this attempt to
establish a
precise equalization is compactly phrased:
"And when
they exchange their products they must
reduce them to
form of proportion, otherwise one of
the two extremes
will have both the excesses." 60

a

56
"Let A be a builder, B a shoemaker, C a house,
and
D a shoe.
The "diagonal combination" as diagrammed
by
Ostwald is a figure in the form of an X on either
side
of which is grouped the alternate transactor and
his
rrnoH nff.r.H
of f our terms. (Ethics, p
125 , nt. 34)

^

57

Aristotle, Ethics,

58

Aristotle, Ethics,

59

Aristotle, Ethics,

60
Aristotle, Ethics,
133b6-7 (italics added)
Rackham clarifies this passage in the following
footnote: "After any unfair exchange one party has too
much by just the amount that by which the other has too
little.
I ought to give you ten shillings more or
something worth that.
Then I have ten shillings too
much, and you have ten too little; these two tens are
my two ’excesses’."

26

Before any of these equalizations
can be effected,
Aristotle tells us that the two
objects which are to be
exchanged must be rendered "comparable
in a way"

(

sumbleta pos),

fcl

phrase which he soon after

a

clarifies as commensurability

(

summetria

62
)

,

The

overarching significance of this concept
emerges in
Aristotle's stipulation that not only
is there "no

community without exchange" but "there
is no exchange
without equality, and no equality without
commensurability." 63

it is well to note that in the

broadest sense, the notion of commensurability
is
related to the history of the Greek term oikos
which
involves "a preoccupation with the political

aspects of

human intercourse

(

justice) ... and the impassioned

searching for what is universal in things at first
sight widely differing from each another." 64

61

Aristotle, Ethics

,

1133al9.

62

Aristotle, Ethics

,

1133bl6,

18,

19,

22.

Aristotle, Ethics 1133bl7-18. As noted by Meikle,
"This commensurability of things that are different by
nature, which is logically presupposed by proportions
of them being equated, is the core of the problem which
exchange presents to economics, though it is one which
economists have rarely confronted head-on."
Aristotle's Economic Thought p. 13).
63

(

,

,

64
K. Singer, "Oikonomia: The Origins of Economic
Thought and Language," p. 35.

To render two disparate objects which
are to be

brought together in

transaction "comparable in

a

a way"

is to identify a property shared by
both objects.

However, Aristotle's account

does not address the

problem of how objects are to be equalized.

In fact,

we are never told at any point in chapter
five how this

direct equalization is to be enacted.
As Meikle suggests, this problem must be

understood in terms of Aristotle's metaphysics.
Objects,

as existing within the category of

"substances" are qualitatively different things; thus,

objects can be compared -- another indication of the

need for the shift from the arithmetic to the
analogical.

The result of such comparison, however,

can not be quantitative, as permitting

measurement necessary to equalization. 65

the ability of
Thus,

commensurability must occur in the dimension where

65
"Most distinctive of a quantity is its being called
both equal and unequal... For example, a body is called
both equal and unequal, and so is a time... But anything
else
whatever is not a quantity
is certainly not,
it would seem, called equal and unequal.
For example,
a condition is certainly not equal and unequal, but
similar."
Categories 6a26-36)
And again: "the
measure is always homogeneous with the thing measured;
the measure of spatial magnitudes is a spatial
magnitude, and in particular that of a length is a
length, that of a breadth a breadth, that of an
articulate sound an articulate sound, that of weight a
weight, that of units a unit." Metaphysics 1053a24

—

—

(

.

,

(

ff.)

28

measurement is to be made.

As Meikle writes,

"because

the equalization of objects demands
a quantification,

and to make them commensurable -- in
conformity with
Aristotle’s categories -- would entail the

determination of what they are quantities of...
this is
what the problem of commensurability amounts
66
to."

The codetermination of equalization and

quanti tativity marks a significant point in
Aristotle's
analysis,

as now drawn toward the precision of the

money form.

That such

a

quantitative valuation must be

assigned to exchange is, as noted in the introduction,
function of instituting general valuation, or, to

a

phrase it differently,

a

means for the koinonis to

regulate the exchange transaction through an assertion
of a common valuation.

As we are told, because

everything that enters into an exchange must somehow
be comparable," it is "for this purpose that money has

been introduced." 67
As a solution to the task of commensurability,

money affords

a

means of creating

objects by representing,

a

relation between

in a measure common to both,

the value of each object to be transacted.

This third

element does not appear to be directly related to the

properties of the objects themselves; rather, it is
66

Meikle, Aristotle's Economic Thought, p. 15.

67

Aristotle, Ethics,

1133al9.
29

posed as

solution to the difficulty of

a

commensurability precisely because of its autonomous
operation.

Money is characterized by Aristotle as

a

median or "middle" term, for it has the ability
to
"measure all things,

(not only their equality but)

the amount by which they exceed or fall short

another)."

68

also

(of one

However as the Greek root of the word

indicates, currency is conventional -- and thus

unstable: 69

as Aristotle tells us, because money has

the name of "currency" or nomos,

nature,

it does not exist by

and it is in our power to "change and

invalidate it." 70

Moreover, as Aristotle notes, it is

also true that "what happens to goods also happens to

money" -- that is to say, money is not consistant in
its representation of value. 71

Although Aristotle concludes that money "tells us
how many shoes are equal to

quantity of food" 72

—

a

house or to a given

there is a critical problem.

Establishing a measure cannot itself create

68

Aristotle, Ethics, 1133al9

69
The Greek work for money, or currency coin is
nomisma and is derived from the same root as nomos
"law" or "convention."

70

Aristotle, Ethics,

1133a30-l

71

Aristotle, Ethics,

1133al9-20,

72

Aristotle, Ethics

1133a23-26
30

1133b8--14

.

commensurability between objects that are
incommensurable; indeed, measure requires that

a

relation between objects has already been
established.

Money, precisely because of its

serviceable autonomy, is not in any way essentially
linked to that which it must measure.
In terms of Aristotle’s categories, money,

as the

expression of exchange value and as the initial
corrective to the problem of rendering objects
"comparable," is inadequate to such

a

task because it

ultimately can not be brought into equalized accord
with the objects themselves: again, because qualities
can not be relations nor can they be quantities, and
visa versa.

Because of the quantity/quality lacuna, it is

consequently impossible for money, an autonomous form
of quantitative measure,

incommensurability.

to solve the problem of

The initial problem posed by the

commensurability/incommensurabilty dichotomy is
reproduced in the "solution" which money provides: the
objects can now be quantified (and hence equalized).

73
That is, there is no difference in this sense
between equating two cabbages with a shoe, or two
cabbages with a coin. Or as Meikle phrases it, "A
measure does not create the property in things which it
measures." (Aristotle's Economic Thought, p. 23 and
passim
)

31

but there is no necessary connection
between the

quantitativity of money and the qualitative
essence of
the objects themselves.
The problem of

commensurability is thus only shifted to

a

second

level
That such a solution merely displaces the
problem

appears to be borne out when, in an effort to

articulate the two disparate categories of quality
and
quantity, Aristotle introduces "need"

narrative

chreia

into the

74

Money,

as Aristotle now offers,

quantitative representative of
need.

(

a

is the

qualitative element

—

This has evolved, he tells us, by way of

"general agreement." 75

However,

the fundamental

difficulty of reconciling the quantitative and
qualitative elements is again reproduced: because it is
lodged in the qualitative realm of use, although "need"
emerges as a basis for things to be measurable

in,

it

74
Aristotle, Ethics, 1133b20-21. Meikle warns
against translating chreia as demand (a mistake which
Rackham, for one, makes)
As Meikle reminds us,
"demand," together with "supply" has no Greek
equivalent. Meikle writes that demand "is now a
theory-laden term carrying a weight of suggestion that
can not be attributed to a Greek author.
The use of
’demand' might also suggest falsely that a modern
subjective or utility form of value might be attributed
to Aristotle." (Aristotle's Economic Thought, p. 23,
.

nt
75

.

19)

Aristotle, Ethics,

1133a30.
32

itself lacks a unit of measure.

As such,

it does not

possess the compound essence necessary
to making
objects commensurable.
lo summarize,

the two elements,

quantity and

quality,

form the core -- and the limit -of the
commensurability problem in the Ethics
As occupying
the category of the qualitative, "need"
can not
.

establish the basis for quantitative measure
necessary
for rendering the unequal equal.

Money, coterminously,

is both necessarily -- and dangerously -autonomous.

At the close of Aristotle's account of exchange
in

chapter five, this lacuna -- and thus the

commensurability problem

—

remains.

This

unbroachability is reflected in the peculiar ending of
the chapter.

After posing an ostensive solution via

the combination of money and need, Aristotle informs us

that

Clearly, this is the way in which exchange took
place before the existence of money, for it makes
no difference whether five beds or the money value
of five beds is the equivalent of a house. 76

We are thus returned to the very beginning of the

inquiry.

In other words,

"proportionate reciprocity,"

as founded on the fundamental incommensurability of

76

Aristotle, Ethics,

1133b25-30.
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objects,

forecloses the possibility of strict
accuracy
restitution which would draw commercial
exchange
into a more explicit relation with
corrective justice.

m

A persistent tension runs between the
imperative
of particular justice as to ison,
which posits that one
leaves the transaction with what one
had when one

entered it ("one's own"), and the unsteady
outcome of
Aristotle's discussion, which poses an
imprecise
adequation" between objects through human
need
(chreia)

This tension between an ideal equality
and

the inequality which is both contained in,

and

generated by, the exchange transaction is implicated
in
Aristotle account of the relation of fair commercial
exchange as the "bond" which holds together the

koinonia
We noted above the integral bond mentioned by

Aristotle in regard to the importance of fair exchange
to political community.

In the first portion of the

chapter we were told that the just, as the "equal,

establishes
together."

7

a

bond "which holds the association
As we saw,

the critical import of

commensurability lies here, in that it holds the
promise of an equalization of difference which is
measurable, and somehow exact, even though it does not
77

Aristotle, Ethics,

1133a2.
34

return the Pythagorean literality
of the " same."
The
point of establishing commensurability
was to eliminate
the "two part" excessive (quantitative)
remainder of
the transaction which can accrue
to one of the two

participants.

In chapter five however,

second context in which

a

there is a

communal bond is mentioned.

The second form is introduced soon
after the

initial introduction of money, at the point
where

Aristotle acknowledges the "impossibility" of
formal
commensurability. 78
recall,

that need

account as

a

It is at this juncture,
(

chreia

as we will

is interjected into the

way of augmenting the quantitativity of

the money form.

Need,

as purportedly inserting a

dimension of comparison, renders the exchange
transaction hiksnos
"sufficient." 79

,

translatable as "adequate" or

The positioning of "need" in this

final attempt to forge an accommodation between the

exchangeable objects, is significant -- for, as

Aristotle seems to be suggesting, it itself is
productive of

a bond.

Aristotle has already told us

that "if men were to require nothing, or were to

78
"Now of course it is impossible that things
differing so greatly from one another should in reality
become commensurable." (Ethics, 1133bl9-20)

79

Ostwald and Rackham, respectively.
35

require things equally, there would
be no exchange or
not the same kind of exchange." 80
And, a few passages
later adding.
it is need which hold the parties
together as
were one sin gle unit is shown by the
fact
It
tnat there is no exchange when one or
both parties
do not stand in need of the other. 81
a

T1

2

^K

The proximity between the role of need,
on one
hand,

and the failed goal of equalization and

commensurability on the other, poses

a

dramatic

contrast to the first version of the communal

imperative of cohesion as linked to isonomia.

absense of

a

The

formal solution to the problem of

commensurability reveals, as we noted, an excessive
remainder produced by the exchange transaction.

This

remainder, as Aristotle’s impasse suggests, is not

readily effaced.

By the conclusion of the chapter this

remainder, and the injustice it signifies, emerges as

potential nexus of the communal bond.

The outcome of

Aristotle's account of the transaction, as framed
within these two critical contexts of communal
cohesion, point toward two sets of implications.
First,

the category of "need" is functionally

implicated in the apparently intractable condition of

80

Aristotle, Ethics,

1133a27-30.

81

Aristotle, Ethics,

1133b7-ll.
36

a

incommensurability; however, as

a

socio-political bond,

need gives rise to an imprecise reciprocity
that is yet
constituted by the structural imprecision it
manifests.
The very constitution of the polis itself
is drawn into

dangerous proximity with the excessive remainder
of
exchange, notwithstanding Aristotle's exertions.
a

To

press this line of suggestion one step further,

a

question can be posed: might the effort to equalize, as
the attempt to efface any excessive remainder of

exchange, be somehow disruptive to the second bond

implicated by Aristotle with regard to the exchange
relation?

Although Aristotle has reached an impasse,

he has uncovered a most provocative circumstance.

B.

Aristotle: The Politics

In the Politics, Aristotle's analysis of exchange

shifts from an undifferentiated mode of exchange to an

analysis based upon differentiating types of exchange
as either "natural" or "unnatural."

Here,

exchange is

presented as a form of acquisition {chremistike)

,

a

term which can refer both to an activity of the

household and the polis.

As noted by Barker,

chrematistike is deployed in three different ways in
the Politics:

generally,

first,

as the art of acquisition

in forms both "natural" and "unnatural";

37

secondly, as the unnatural forms
through which

individual gain is accrued; and third,
as "necessary"
and "natural" forms of acquisition. 82
In the Politics Aristotle,

exchange

m

the idea of sufficiency, or autarkes,

condition of "having enough" 83
it would seem,

ison.

roots the practice of

—

the

far less demanding,

as

than the onus associated with the to

Although autarkes may generally evoke the

perception of

a

simple satiety reminiscent of the "city

of pigs" in Plato's Republic,

to "have enough" within

the context of the political association is to
possess

not merely "enough" for mere life

something more.

'

(zoe),

but yet

For although the state originates in

the act of acquiring the rudimentary needs of life,

continues for the sake of the "good life"
zen)

84
,

it

(to eu

To partake in the "good life" is to practice

82
Ernest Barker, The Politics of Aristotle (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1958), p. 22, nt E. Although
chremistike is the most commonly used term, lambanein,
the antithesis of give, which can alternately mean
"get," "take" or "receive," is occasionally used.
Unless otherwise indicated, excerpts of the Politics
are taken from Barker's translation.
.

Although in some contexts translated as
"independence of other," the most common usage of this
term in the writings of Aristotle is "having enough."
83

To eu zen can also be translated as "flourishing."
As Aristotle tells us in the second chapter of Book I,
"When we come to the final and perfect association,
formed from a number of villages, we have already
reached the polis -- an association which may be said
to have reached the height of full self-sufficiency; or
rather, we may say while it grows for the sake of mere
84

38

goodness

(eudaimonia)

,

a

practice only open to those

who are freed from necessity. 85

requires

The "good life" thus

form of a "contained abundance" -released
from the constraints of, but
supported by, natural
abundance
in order to allow the independent
pursuit
of politics for its own sake and
not in the spirit of
gain pleonexia 86 The end of the
a

-

(

"art" of

,

life

[and is at that stage, still short
of full selfit exists [once fully grown] for
,
the sake
of the good life [and is fully
self-sufficient]
S u f f icrency]

85 As Barker writes of the social
strata of the
Greeks: "Apart from the depressed class of
household
s aves (douloi) and that of serfs
or dependents tied to
the soil, (...generally designated as
perioikoi) , there
were two mam strata.
The upper is called by various
names
the course of the Politics.
numerically,
(this group) is 'the few' {oligoi)
economically, it is
the wealthy' (plousioi) or 'the possessing'
class: in
point of culture and prestige, it is 'the better'
or
the best'
beltiones or aristoi)
or again it is 'the
notables' (gnorimoi)
or it is 'the reasonable and
fair
(epieikeis) who make up the better sort, or it is
'the men who are reasonable and fair and able to
enjoy
leisure.'
The other class has a variety of names,
but all are by their nature 'unleisured'
ascholoi
spending their days in a cycle of 'toil' and
relaxation
ponos and anapausi s)
and having no
opportunity for leisure."
(The Politics of Aristotle,
[New York: Oxford University Press, 1946], pp. lxxiiilxiv)
Compare to Plato, Laws 807c-e regarding the
detriment of engaging in a "multitude of little trivial
directions about household arrangements." Pericles, as
Plutarch tells us in his Lives, relegated the
administration of all the economic affairs of the
household to a single servant, Evangelus.

m

.

.

;

(

,

,

(

(

,

,

.

86
Thus, wealth, in its proper and limited form, is
closely related to the notion of "sufficiency." It is
contained likewise in the definition of wealth
kouros
Other terms for wealth include ploytos or
ktesis. The ambiguous nature of the capacities and
potentialities of wealth are found in the fifth
century Anonymus Jamblichi which ascribes the impulse
(

)

.

,

39

acquisition is thus

a

"supply of objects," which are

'necessary for (the good)

life" and "useful to the

association of the polis or the household." 87

The point of departure for Aristotle
is Solon's

commonly circulated adage: "But of riches
no bound has
been fixed or revealed to men." Rather, as
Aristotle
rejoins,

^ liroit has

been fixed,
since no tool belonging
limit whether in number
collection of tools for
statesman. 88

as with the other arts,
to any art is without a
or size, and riches are a

the householder and the

toward wealth to "fear of common contingencies,
sickness, old age and sudden loss of possessions and
the desire to outdo others, ambition emulation and the
desire to acquire positions of power." (Quoted in
Singer, Oikonomia, p. 41).
Politics, 1256b30-34
"Wealth as a whole, consists
in using things rather than owning them; it is really
the activity -- that is, the use
of the property
that constitutes wealth." Rhetoric trans. John Henry
Freese [Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 19671,
87

.

—

(

1361a23ff

,

)

Politics, 1256a34ff (Rackham)
Approaches to this
issue are manifold: Plato in one instance defines
proper wealth as "true" wealth athenos in nonmaterial qualities -- the possession of the immaterial
goods of wisdom and virtue.
Symposium iii 8 and iv 3344).
See also the discussion of wealth in the PseudoPlatonic Eryxias.
In a another tack, the definition of
"proper" wealth is redrawn to signify the prepolitical
condition. As Solon writes, "Surely equal is the
wealth of him that hath much silver and gold and fields
of wheatland and horses and mules, to him that hath but
this -- comfort in belly and sides and feet." Elegy
and Iambus, Vol. I, trans. J.M. Edmonds [New York, G.P.
Putnam's Son's, 1931], Frag. 24). Or, as Herodotus
88

.

(

)

(

(

40

Here, Aristotle broadly echoes the
customary Greek

treatment of wealth, which categorically
asserts use as
the limit to acquisition
but he approaches

—

this

position, however, by identifying the
specific modes of
acquisition chremistike which will express
the limits
designated by nature which are represented by
89
(

)

use.

For Aristotle, use represents a fundamental
form of

measure and limit because nature
techne

purpose

—

—

as opposed to

fashions nothing without a limit or

90

writes, "The very wealthy is no better off than he who
has sufficient for the day."
Histories i, 32). The
ambiguity between limit, measure and surplus is
suggested by Xenophon when he writes of "increasing the
estate by showing a balance {periousia
(Oikonomikos, 14, in Works, ed. E.C. Marchant [New
York: Oxford University Press, 1947)
(

,

.

)

89
In both pre-classical and classical Greek
literature the excessive attributes of wealth are
commonly contained by an association with an extremely
amorphous sense of "use." For example, as we are told
by Xenophon, wealth is that which consists of
"serviceable things." Or, elsewhere, wealth is
"whatever is useful to life" and "useful," in turn, is
tautologically defined as "everything that anyone knows
how to use."
Oikonomikos ii. 2-8, iv 33-44, vi 4).
Xenophon uses the term chremata to signify the "excess
of goods over needs," chremata itself receiving no
further elaboration.
The definition of proper wealth
through use also appears in Aristotle’s Rhetoric:
"In
a word, being wealthy consists rather in use than in
possession, for the actualization and use of such
things is wealth."
(Rhetoric, 1361a23ff)
(

,

Nature may be understood in
Cf. Politics, 1253al0.
90
two ways; first, in terms of natural objects which
serve larger purposes, and secondly, that there exists
in the universe an comprehensive order or aim that is
reproduced throughout nature. As Barker tells us, "The
41

The first form of chremistike
introduced by

Aristotle is represented by
occupations dependent on
one’s own labors:
herding, farming,
piracy,

fishing

and hunting.

Such acquisition is deemed
by Aristotle
to be in conformity with the
contained abundance of
"true wealth" (to alethinos
ploutos) 92 indicating
"goods, capable of accumulation,
which are necessary
,

for

(the good)

household.

93

life and useful for the community
or
For Aristotle,

the household, or oikos,

serves as a model for "sufficiency,"
without which

conception of end has come before us in many
names, and
from many aspects. As a ’form’, it
represents the
shape into which amorphous matter is moldedas
Nature’
it represents identification with
that ideal,
towards which all movement is directed. As
'function'
1 ®
that full height of action, to participate
in
which constitutes partnership in the body
politic which
the degree of participation is the standard.
As
essence’, the end has already presented itself
as the
content of definition and the criterion of
classification: as 'limit', we still have to notice, it
determines the character of its means." (Barker, The
Political Thought of Plato and Aristotle, p. 229 and
p
269 passim)
.

.

.

.

The art of war is considered by Aristotle to be a
form of hunting: "hunting ought to be practiced
not
only against wild animals, by also against human beings
who are intended by nature to be ruled by others and
refuse to obey that intention." (Politics, 1256b§ll)
91

—

92

Aristotle,

Politics,

1256b30ff.

(Rackham)

93
Aristotle, Politics, 1256b7ff. (Rackham)
Aristotle
defines necessity as "anything without which it is
not possible for good to exist or come to be, or for
bad to be discarded, or gotten rid of." Metaphysics
1015a20f f
(

)

42

there is no possibility for attaining
the proper
surplus of "true wealth": a ready stock
of useful
things
However,

as we are told "there is another
kind of

acquisition that is specifically called
wealth-getting
(

chrematiske) ... and to this kind it is due
that there

is thought to be no limit to riches
and property." 94

a

A ristotle continues,
There are many who hold this second form of
the
art to be identical with the other form,
previously
mentioned, because it has affinities with it. In
fact it is not identical, and yet it is not
far
removed. The other form previously mentioned is
natural, this second form is not natural, but
rather the product of a certain sort of experience
95
and skill (techne)
.

.

,

The task of demarcating the natural form from the

unnatural is one which takes up the unsolved problem of

incommensurability in an alternative way.

The

qualitative/quantitative antinomy that appeared in the
Ethics prefigures the central dualism undergirding the

discussion in the Politics: value-in-use and value-inexchange.

Here, Aristotle attempts to find specific

forms of exchange which are themselves inherently

commensurable

.

It is important to note putatively that

the qualitative element of exchange is in all cases

94

Aristotle,

Politics

95

Aristotle,

Politics,

,

1256b40ff.
1257a4ff.
43

(Rackham)
(Rackham)

lodged in the objects transacted
as opposed to the
subjects transacting, as was
the case in the example
of
chreia.

Aristotle ascribes to all objects
which occupy the
field of human intercourse a
two-fold character:

nlh

° f P r0 P er ty have two
possible uses
° f t ese uses belon
to
the
9
article
as such
a
d° n
belong t0 it ln the

same manner 'or
ent
he ° ne USe 18 P r °P er “d
to
l T concerned; the other is
t0 t^
th artlcle
°!l

pecSLr
a
i
not

The proper and "particular" use of
an object is thus in

accord with the qualitative nature of
the object,
rendering it suitable to a single purpose. 97

To use an

object in this way thus allows the subject
to be

directed by the object's essential nature.
"use," however,

exchanged.

wear as

a

refers to each object's ability to be

A shoe, for example,

can be used for "its

shoe" and "its use as an article of exchange

{metabletike

)

;

for both are ways of using a shoe." 99

Although exchange thus is
article as such,

"

Aristotle,

a use

which "belongs to the

it is yet not specific or endemic to

the article concerned.

96

The second

Politics,

As he continues,

1257a6-10.

97
Aristotle, Politics, 1257a2-3. And, as Aristotle
tells us, "for whoever produces something produces it
for an end."
Ethics 113 9b 1 — 3
(

98

Aristotle,

)

,

Politics, 1257a2.
44

need^the a!Ei!r
C
Since

& S5i

y 0r food '

wlth

.

not^een

iSi

Person who

a

23e"&

is^^t^S^r^ecunar

^

Se*^^
l£

°£

All articles of property, we are
told, possess this
dual capacity: "Exchange is possible
in regard to them
all: it arises from the natural
facts of the case, and
this is due to some men having more,
and some
less,

than suffice for their needs." 100
Exchange, absent from the first form of

chremistike,

is now to be traced in successive
forms.

The first, barter,

is a "proper" form of exchange

yet apparently suitable only to
forms.

—

pre-political tribal

Such associations, barter, we are told, is

a

"proper" form of exchange "for such tribes do not go

beyond exchanging

(

allage

actual commodities" 101

—

)

a

actual commodities for
form of exchange carried out

only "to the extent that sufficed for the needs of both

parties." 10

99

"

This mode of acquisition is not contrary

Aristotle, Politics

1257a2

100

Aristotle,

Politics,

1257a4

101

Aristotle,

Politics,

1257a24ff.

(Rackham)

Aristotle, Politics, 1257a§4. Rackham s
translation reads "for it existed for the replenishment
of natural self-sufficiency (autarkeias ."
102

1

)

45

to nature,

and yet, as Aristotle tells
us,

it is from

this that the "art of business"
as a means of "wealthgetting" in due course arose. 103
The next stage involves the
shift from barter to

exchange

mediated by coinage, facilitated,
according
to Aristotle's account, by trade
104
over
distance.

We

are told that initially money
functioned as a "measure"
which served to merely represent
material wealth. 105 it
was thus from this "necessary" innovation,
that

"unnatural" forms of exchange were to emerge.

Exchange

eventually became "more highly organized as
experience
discovered the sources and methods technikoteron
(

)

exchange that would cause most profit." 106

of

Although in

this instance profit is cited as a function of
method,
the problem in fact arises from certain structural

aspects of the exchange form itself, as freed from the

barter form.
poses

a

As "the first element of commerce," money

singular problem: unlike the "natural" and

limited forms of acquisition, the "riches" created
"are truly unlimited." 107

The boundlessness of this

form of exchange lies in the fact that money allows
103

Aristotle, Politics

1257a30ff.

(Rackham)

104

Aristotle, Politics

1257a33ff.

(Rackham)

105

Aristotle, Politics

1257a39

106

Aristotle, Politics

1257b4ff.

107

Aristotle, Politics

1257b28
46

(Rackham)

each object to take on
extrinsic characteristic
independent of the object
represented, distancing it
from the natural limit of
use.
Value-in-exchange, as
represented by money, does not
possess an inherent
limit, unlike the material
object which pronounces its
own end in the act of use.
Money, as Aristotle tells
US, is thus both the means
("the starting point") and
the end of retail exchange
(kapelike), the
act of

buying in order to sell.

Aristotle's definition of money as
either a
measure or as a force which effaces
the proper ends of
the objects themselves; therefore
yield two
general

types of exchange transactions. 108
act

(

kapelike

First,

as a gainful

whereby exchange is undertaken to the

end of an increase of money; and secondly,
the natural
or proper acquisition for which "money
was intended to
be used." 109

Despite the differences between natural exchange
(metablike)

and unnatural exchange {kapelike)

Aristotle remarks that there is yet
affinity" 110

a

,

"close

(epallattei) between the two forms, an

108
In this regard, see Aristotle's remarks as to the
Delphic knife, which as made for the purpose not of
use, but for a gainful exchange, is created in a
"spirit of stint."
(Politics, 1252b3)

109
110

Aristotle, Politics,

1258b8.

(Rackham)
47

affinity attributable to the
monetary medium deployed
in both instances. Consequently,
as Aristotle tells us
They overlap epallattei because
they are both
handlrug the same objects and acting
in the same
°f
qU1 ltl0n; but they move alon
?S
g different
K
lines --the object
of the one being simple
that ° f the ° ther some?hing
quite
deferent!(

'

In both cases,

two ends,

^

the vehicle is the same; however,

the

detrimental and beneficial, can not be

clearly distinguished from one another.

However,

Aristotle does, in fact, discern quite
clearly two
types of wholly unambiguous transactions:

barter, which

excludes the money form, and usury

(

obolostatke

unmediated exchange of money for money

—

an

"the breeding

of money from money." 112

In concluding his analysis of exchange forms,

Aristotle is not only unable to maintain

a

fundamental

distinction between money usages, but his conclusion
confirms the suspicion which he set out to annul:
"There are many who hold this second form of the art

111

Aristotle, Politics,

1257b§55.

112 Aristotle, Politics
1258b5. "For money was
intended to be used in exchange, but not to increase at
interest.... And this term interest {tokos) which means
the birth of money from money, is applied to money
because the offspring resembles the parent. Wherefore
of all the modes of getting wealth this is the most
unnatural."
(Politics, 1258bl-8, 1258a37)
,

48

(unnatural)

to be identical with the
other form

(natural)...

m

fact it is not identical, and
yet it is
not far removed." 113

E xchange and Political

C.

As posed

m

the Ethics

Community

strict commensurability

,

between objects of exchange can not
be established, and
proper exchange forms can not be clearly
demarcated
from improper forms in the Politics.
Troubling
implications thus ensue not only for the ideal
of
justice as

a

form of isonomia, but for the very

constitution of the polis.

The outcome of Aristotle's

discussions of exchange points to the excess produced
by the exchange relation, an excess conferring gain
(

both excesses

the transaction.

)

upon one of the two participants in
The implication of Aristotle's

analysis is that such one-sided accretion can no longer
be simply be an issue of the adventitious trader who

practices

a

particular mode of techne.

Because the

unlimited essence of exchange-value can infect any

money-mediated transaction, the intent to gain from
another can not be clearly separated from the formal
(monetary) means through which the exchange relation is

executed.
113

For this reason,

Aristotle,

Politics,

the transaction of both the

157a§l.
49

citizen and the trader traverse
the surreptitious
margin by which exchange can
generate a gain incurred
"at the expense of another." 11 *

This indeterminate

realm of advantaging and mutuality
is evoked in Book
Eight of the Ethics:
Travelers. ..associate together for
some advantaae
sumpheronti
namely to procure some of their
necessary suppiies
But the political association
0°' it 1S believed, was originally
formed, and
continues to be maintained, for the
(general)
advantage sumpherontos of its members.
115
.

(

)

,

(

)

In this passage,

the organization of the polis
appears

to be based upon the notion of
"advantage"

(

supheronti

represented in both singular and mutual terms. 116
such,

As

there exists an ambiguity between that
advantage

which is individual and that which is common.

It would

114
The sizable stakes involved in keeping the two
elements clearly separated is expressed in the fact
that in classical Athens, trade was an occupation
which
was widely held by non-citizens (metics)
In the
secondary literature it is common to only attribute
this separation to the lack of esteem accorded to
trading, as simply grouped with mechanical work.
See
for example, Augustus Boeckh, The Public Economy of the
Athenians trans. Anthony Lamb (Boston: Little, Brown &
Company, 1857)
For a general discussion of the
metics see P. Gauthier, Symbola. Les etrangers et la
justice dans les cites grecques (Nancy: 1972); and with
regard to Aristotle, J. Pecirka, "A Note on Aristotle's
Conception of Citizenship and the role of Foreigners in
4th C. Athens," Eirene 6 (1967).
.

,

.

,

115

Aristotle, Ethics,

1160a.

(Rackham)

116 The term can also signify "profitably" or "with
expediency."
(H.G. Liddell and Robert Scott, A GreekEnglish Lexicon [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1940], s.v.
"sumpherontos")
.
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here be useful to remark upon
the more subtle
characterizations of the relationship
between
individual and mutual forms of
"advantage" as found in
Plato’s Republic, a work in which
the question of
advantage is pivotal. 117

Political society, as Plato tells
us,

finds its

inception in the fundamental needs of
human beings, and
it is the particular function
of exchange to
fulfill

such needs.

11
-

in this account we find the
following

fascinating determination: "If one man
gives another
what he has to give in exchange metadosis
for what he
can get, it is because each finds that
to
(

do so is for

his own advantage." 119

The word for "advantage" is

derived in this translation by Barker from ameinon.
117
Advantage" is commonly rendered in the Republic
as pi eonexia -- a term capturing the essence
of Plato's
definitions of injustice. Derived from to pleon or
too much," pleonexia is to "exceed one's rightful
sphere or function." The term means literally, "to

have or gain some advantage over another," "to have or
take more than another" or to "claim more than is one's
due.
(Liddell and Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon,
s.v. "pleonexia")
.

118
My notion is, said I, that a state comes into
existence because no individual is self-sufficing; we
all have many needs... So, having all these needs, we
call in one another's help to satisfy our various
requirements; and when we have collected a number of
helpers and associates to live together in one place,
we call that settlement a state." Republic trans.
Paul Shorey, Loeb Classical Library [Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1930], 369c).
(

119

Plato,

Republic, 369c.
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Barker chooses "advantage"
over the more literal
meaning of ameinon as "better
for, " a translation
which
Shorey, for one, employs.
The word thus signifies
both
the sense of advantage over
another as well as a
sense

of benefit promoting welfare,

benefit conferred by health. 120

as for example in the

This obscurity is

likewise present in the word opheleo
which is
alternately used to signify "advantage"

or "profit";

yet opheleo can also refer to
"the common interest of
dll,
benefit" or "aid" -- an ambiguity
shrewdly

played upon when Plato uses opheleo in
the context of
describing the form of justice that at
both "benefits"
friends and harms enemies. 121

The way in which

advantage, as relative advantage, and advantage
as

beneficial" or mutual, play off one another is
also
found in the encounter with Thrasymachus at
the

end of

Book

I.

Here,

Plato progressively shifts the meaning

of "advantage" toward the sense of benefit by
purging

the self-advantaging

(pleonastic)

element from the

120
The ambiguity is likewise present in English
usage.
Although advantage generally signifies "a
superior position" or "the position of being in advance
or ahead of another."
It can also connote "benefit,
enhancement, improvement" or "to increase or augment
the effect of any thing."
In the former instance, the
inflection can also be a "pecuniary profit or gain,
interest on money lent"; and, in accord with the root
of pleonexia, "greater quantity or number, 'moreness'... overplus, excess." (Oxford English Dictionary,
n.v. "advantage").
121

Plato,

Republic 334b.
52

definition.

In this chapter,

advantage which exists

outside of the context of the
mutually beneficent
political association is, in the
final

instance, deemed

fundamentally "inadvantageous

.

Such phrasing is especially
interesting given the
fact that in the Republic Plato's
rudimentary state
the infamous city of pigs
already includes

—

—

the

presence of exchange via money forms.

There thus

exists an ambiguity with regard to the
use of
metadosis for while it means literally

"to give a

share"; yet,

as positioned in this example,

it also

suggests an act of simultaneous and unmediated
transfer.

In contrast to Aristotle's genealogy
of

acquisitive forms in the Politics, the acquisitive
forms inhabiting the rudimentary state entirely

outstrip their circumscribed context. 122

Indeed,

that

Plato is well aware of the dangers which ensue from

these forms is attested to in the Laws, in which

certain forms of trade and coinage are strictly
regulated.

123

This portion of Plato's account in the Republic

approximates the same ambiguity suggested by

Aristotle's discussion in book five of the Ethics.
we will recall, at the conclusion of Aristotle's
122

Plato,

Republic,

123 See for example,

371.

Plato,

Laws, V 742a.
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As

"

account,

the problem of commensurability
is addressed
in terms of "need” (chreia).
Moreover, it is important
to note that the usages of
chreia not only include
need, "
"use" or even "service" -- but
also

"advantage." 124

"Mutuality" here becomes an

doppel ganger, as it were, with the
uneasy cohesion
afforded by "advantage" -- or the
expectation thereof.

To represent this element contained
in need --

both excessive and cohesive

—

in terms of exchange is

to return to the very raison d'etre of
particular

justice as the basis

of a series of limits expressly

designed to contain the possibility of taking from
another that which is not "one's own."

The entire

problem of "advantage" is perhaps located within what
H.H.

Joachim refers to as the "generic identity"

of justice and injustice

--

by which both justice and

injustice "issue in actions advantaging or

disadvantaging another." 125
The issue of exchange foregrounds the fundamental

question of the relation between individual gain and

community

—

the negotiation of the relation between

individual advantage and the "advantage" of others who
Liddell and Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon,
"chreia

124

sv.

.

125

Joachim,

Nichomachean Ethics, pp. 128 and 130.
54

together constitute the political
koinonia
While
exchange is posed as a form of
necessity and mutuality,
it nevertheless stands in a
mutable, if unstable,
.

relation to individual gain.
relentless defiance of

a

The transaction,

in

strict isonomia, is neither

able to distinguish between need
or advantage
while
the "unearned increment" may be
conferred nonetheless.
In the end, despite all of
Aristotle's exertions,
mutual "gain" is found to be inseparable
from

-

individual advantage.

It is here fitting to recall

Aristotle's most favored category of chremistike
in the
Politics. Agriculture and hunting, as
portrayed in the
Politics

,

are subsumed under a category of acquisition

that is above all distinguished by the absence
of

exchange:

"Property of this sort then seems to be

bestowed by nature herself upon all." 126
of the exchange relation,

a

The complexity

relation which,

paradoxically, creates the possibility of both

providing for and gaining from others, explains the
inclusion of both piracy and war in Aristotle's
natural or "proper" category of acquisition.

In both

instances the central criterion is met; for both piracy
and war are forms of acquisition which avoid the

questions of fairness and mutuality raised by the

exchange transaction.
126

In this case,

Aristotle, Politics,. 1256b8-9.
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"advantage" is

.

decisively conferred

—

not from nature, but from

those human creatures who exist
outside the political
association

56
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CHAPTER II
EARLY MODERN APPROACHES TO THE
PROBLEM OF EXCHANGE

The pr° fit of one
is thQ damagQ Qf
another... No man profitith but
by
y the
loss of others.
Montaigne

Mercantilism: Exc hange and Absolute AdvantarrP

A..

Aristotle's analysis of exchange as taken
up by
the Canonist doctrine of "just price"
does not

survive

the accelerating expansion of trade in
the late Middle

Ages

.

The body of economic thought which was
to

arise from this period of commercial expansion
is
127
The problem of individual gain which lies at
the
heart of the issue of the just price is broadly
cast in
two forms in the Canonist literature: first, the
stringent attempt to equalize exchange, the pro par
pari, and the attempt to ascertain a minimal form of
profit to be accrued.
In the former instance, all gain
was regarded as suspect, and in the latter, modest
gains were regarded as acceptable.
These two positions
broadly follow the impulses of Ethics, Book V and the
Politics, Book I, respectively.
The extent of the
faithful reproduction of the works of Aristotle by the
Canonists, or to what extent their general depictions
reflect my own reading of Aristotle, is not significant
to the broader aim of the task at hand. For a useful
summary of the social-economic factors which gave rise
to mercantilism, see volume I, chapters I-IV of Eli
Heckscher's Mercantilism, trans. Mendel Shapiro
(London: George Allen & Unwin, 1955).
Regarding the
formal break between the disciplines of political
economy and political thought which occurred in the
16th century, see Richard Olson, The Emergence of the
Social Sciences (New York: Twayne, 1993)
57

.

,

.

broadly referred to as mercantilism. 128

Mercantilist

reasoning may be generally summed by the
following
tenets:

first,

that money or treasure constitutes

wealth; and secondly, that foreign trade
is the only
means to generate wealth. 129 The often
fantastic logics
which emerge within this form of economic
thought have
led to a tendency to dismiss mercantilism
for

primitive" economic reasoning --

indeed,

Schumpeter

employs the word "contempt" when describing this
general perception.

1

Despite this perception, the

128
Regarding the difficulties and abuses associated
with the moniker "mercantilism," see E.G.A. Johnson,
Predecessors of Adam Smith (New York: A.M. Kellev
1937)

,

pp.

3-4

.

129 See for example, M. Beer, Early British Economics
(New York: A.M. Kelley, 1967), pp. 60-61.
The degree
to which these faiths are held by all those
historically considered to be mercantilists will not be
treated, given the purpose at hand.
To most generally
organize mercantilist thought, I have found Beer’s
division of mercantilism into two periods corresponding
to English history most helpful: from Edward I to Queen
Elizabeth and from the Stuarts to the ascension of the
Hanoverians Beer emphasizes the continuity of the
fundamental idea of drawing "treasure" into the realm,
although methods employed differ: "In the first period

personal monarchy enacted so-called bullionist
ordinances and statutes for that purpose. In the second
period, the merchants attempted to accomplish that aim
by the balance of trade policy." (Early British
Economics, pp. 61-62)
Schumpeter, History of Economic Analysis p. 336.
Beer is less acrimonious.
He writes that despite all,
"The mercantilist doctrine must have answered the
interests and logic of its age." (Early British
Economics, p. 62)
130

58

mercantilists afford a valuable
expression -- or
rather, a series of symptoms
of the problem

—

of gain

resulting from exchange.

Aristotle's analysis of exchange had
begun with
the effort to distinguish between
the two
form of

exchange,

the one mutual and fair,

adventitious and unequal.

the other

Aristotle's efforts reveal

the simultaneous existence of both these
elements, but
his efforts to theoretically divide or
cordon off the

mutual and necessary aspects from the dangerous
ones
are,

in the last instance,
Now,

stymied.

the central implication which attends the

adventitious form of exchange is that quantitative
advantage is conferred to only one of the two

transacting parties.

In the Middle Ages,

once the

possibility of the ideal of the pro par pari was
yielded,

the difficulty involved demarcating the proper

degree of gain -- the determination of
"excess," as it were.

proportionate

a

In mercantilist doctrine,

however, all ambiguities with regard to either

equalization or gain are expelled.

Mercantilist

doctrine asserts the possibility of exacting

a

maximum

monetary advantage from the exchange transaction, an
end the classical world perceived as problematic.
However,

the mercantilist reasonings with regard to

monetary advantage may be understood as
59

a

maneuver

.

which does not so much violate
classical thought as it
appears to outflank the Aristotelian
problems
associated with exchange. The mercantilists
posed a
direct solution for the theoretical,
political
and

ethical ambiguities of monetary gain:
simply phrased,
the unequal or excessive element which
emerges from
exchange is to be expelled beyond the limits
of the

political association.

The new political form which is

to serve as the territorial limit is the
nation-

state

131
.

Characterized by "precise boundaries, and...
objectives,

loyalties, and recognized moral obligations

largely confined to these boundaries"

represented

a

the nation-state

departure from previous European

perspectives influenced by the universalism of
Christian thought. 132
exchange as

a

As the first legitimation of

means of exacting an unambiguous maximum

of monetary gain from the exchange transaction,

the

131
For a good collection of writings on the
relationship between the early forms of the nationstate and trade relations, see James D. Tracy, ed. The
Political Economy of Merchant Empires: State Power and
World Trade 1350-1750 (Cambridge: Cambridge University

Press,

1991)

132
Jacob Viner, "The Nation-State and Private
Enterprise" in Essays on the Intellectual History of
Economics (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
As we are told by Beer, "The gradual
1991), pp. 45-46.
abandonment of medieval universalism in commerce and
religion was preceded in philosophy by the abandonment
of the Universals in favor of the Particulars
(nominalism)."
(Early British Economics, pp. 73-74).
60

mercantilist approach to exchange
defines clear lines
of advantage
as assumed over rival
states.

The

founding tenet of mercantilist policy
is that it
"should be framed and executed in strictly

nationalistic terms, that is national
advantage alone
is to be given weight." 133
In the seventeenth

century,

the material form of national advantage
complements
133
The nature of this advantage is generally
posed in
one of two ways in the secondary literature.
Heckscher, following Gustav Schmoller The
Mercantile
System. [New York: Macmillan, 1910]], argues
that the
consolidation of power is the sole form of advantage
sought by the early forms of the nation-state, a
position countered by Viner who emphasizes the equal
importance of material gain.
These twin goals are
interrelated by Viner, each a "prerequisite for the
attainment of the other." See his "Power Versus Plenty
as Objectives of Foreign Policy in the Seventeenth and
Eighteenth Centuries" and "The Nation State and Private
Enterprise" in Essays on the Intellectual History of
Economics (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1991)
It is of interest to compare this conception of
the nation state with the characterization of the
medieval town, which, as Schmoller writes, was a selfsufficient economic organism: "each town, and
especially each of the larger towns, seeks to shut
itself up to itself as an economic whole, and, at the
same time, in its relation to the outside world, to
extend the sphere of its influence, both economic and
political, as far as possible... "market-rights, tollrights and mile-rights (Meilenrecht are the weapons by
which the town creates for itself both revenue and
municipal policy... The soul of that policy is the
putting of fellow citizens at an advantage, and of
competitors from outside at a disadvantage." As
Schmoller adds, the old constitution of the village
"must be broken up by the creation of great states and
by other forces, before another and higher development
of economic life can make its appearance." (The
Mercantile System, p. 6). Heinrich Kleist's "Michael
Kohlhaas," a short story set within this historical
period, will be the subject of a forthcoming essay on
the issues associated with the symbolic and material
transactivity of exchange.
(

.

)

61

.

that of political advantage: both
forms were conceived
as operating on the principal of
zero-sum gain. 134

Commerce here mirrors the strictures of
foreign policy
for which there exists a fixed quantity
of not only
political but economic resources; 135 as the
,

mercantilist Francis Bacon writes, "whatsoever
is
somewhere gotten is somewhere lost" and "what

one

gains,

the other loses." 136

Profits from commercial trade, as Thomas Mun
tells
are measured by the amount the sale exceeds
the

us,

purchase and this difference in price is paid by the

134
Viner attempts to distinguish the two usages of
differential gain in a highly germane way: "In the
field of power it is correct to say that power is
relative, not absolute, and that therefore what A gains
in power must be at the expense of some B. In the field
of wealth, it is not correct to hold that wealth is
static or has some definitely prescribed limits, and it
is not correct to say that one man's or one country's
gain must be another man's or country's loss. But one
country's gain can be, may be another country's
loss... By capturing booty in war, by piracy, by
monopolizing trade routes... by monopolizing by force
against potential rivals an export market or a source
of valuable imports, it was wholly possible in theory
and to some extent realizable in practice for a
country by use of
its power to enrich itself through
impoverishing another country or countries." Essays on
the Intellectual History of Economics, p. 47)
(

.

135
"Scarcely any other element in mercantilist
philosophy contributed more to the shaping of economic
policy, and foreign policy as a whole." (Mercantilism,
Vol II, p. 24)
.

136
Francis Bacon, Essays, no. 15, "Of Seditions and
Troubles"; Montchretien, Traicte de l'Oeconomie
politique. (Quoted in Heckscher, vol. II, p. 26).
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"

foreign consumer.

i:

As exchange in the form of

foreign trade is the "ordinary means
of national
increase," Mun advises that this increase
is brought
about by a favorable balance of trade.
According to
Mun,

"we must ever observe this rule:

to sell more to

strangers yearly than we consume of theirs in
value,
for it is only the "treasure which is
brought into the

Realm by the balance of our foreign trade" which
constitutes the amount "by which we are enriched." 138
As Heckscher notes, this demand for an export surplus
was expressed by the mercantilists "in every possible
way.

" 139

In mercantilist thought,

the difficulties

associated with the classical understanding of exchange
are not directly solved but,

rather,

they are shifted,

insofar as the surplus which now accrues is exacted not

from within the political community

Baptist Colbert in

a

.

Here is Jean-

letter to a King:

It is not possible to increase [the stock of one
country] by 20, 30 or 50 million without at the
same time taking the same quantity from neighboring
states.
Thus arises this twofold increase
(elevation)
which has been so clearly discernable
,

137
Thomas Mun, England's Treasure by Foreign Trade
[1664] (New York: Augustus M. Kelley, 1965), p. 21.
138 Mun, England's Treasure by Foreign Trade, p. 21.
On the balance of trade, also see Beer, Early British
Economics chapter VIII.
,

139

Heckscher, Mercantilism, vol. II, p. 116.
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for several years past: on the one
hand
and greatness of Your Majesty increases, the power
other that of your enemies and ill-wisherson the
falls
Or,

as Francis Bacon phrases it,

14 0

"It is likewise to be

remembered that the increase of any Estate must
be
upon the Foreigner." 141
The constitution of domestic exchange in
much of

mercantilist thought follows

a

complementary logic in

accord with the principle tenets attributed to foreign
exchange.

Because the calculation of gain or loss is

asserted only in terms of the state as an aggregate
form,

the problem of domestic individual gain or loss

is absorbed,

or rather, neutralized.

As Mun tells us,

because "the gain of one subject is the loss of
another" exchanges in the home market are simply

"unprofitable." 142

Alongside this position, which

posits wealth as a "vibration" between transactors, is
another,
a

in which domestic trade is cast as a means to

maintenance of individuals.

As F.W. von Schrotter

writes, domestic trade makes people happy, but not

140
p.

Colbert,

Lettres VI, quoted in Heckscher, vol.

II,

27.

141
Francis Bacon, Essays, "Of Seditions and Troubles"
(New York: C.S. Francis & Co., 1857).
Most polished of
this static conception is offered by Colbert, who, as
Heckscher writes, "applied the conception in practice
in a most ominous manner." Mercantilism pp. 26-27).
(

142

Mun,

,

England's Treasure by Foreign Trade, ch.
64

14.

rich; and as Mathias de Saint-Jean
tells us,

foreign

trade "fattens the natives while
domestic trade only
provides for sustenance." 143

The mercantilist displacement of the
excessive

elements of exchange is, paradoxically, filtered
through

a

group traditionally regarded in an ambiguous

light -- the merchant traders.

In the mercantilist

epoch the status of the merchant was elevated to
level.

new

a

Praises of merchants now scale dazzling

heights, most notably in the writings of Mun.

Mun,

himself a merchant, writes of merchants as "stewards of
the stock of the kingdom,

Agent

and,

as the "principal

in this great business" of increasing national

(s)

wealth,

"

the merchant is an ideal counsel to the

sovereign. 144

As one commentator has suggested, given

Mun’s general description, the merchant would be the
ideal citizen.

145

Such sentiments were not uniformly

If Mun is the most effusive in his praise of the

held.

merchant, Gerald Malynes is the most critical, arguing
that because trade is based upon the self-interest of

143
p.

144

Both quoted in Heckscher, Mercantilism, vol.

II,

193.

Mun,

England's Treasure by Foreign Trade, pp. 2-6.

145 E.G.A. Johnson, Predecessors of Adam Smith
York: Augustus M. Kelley, 1965), p. 78.
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(New

merchants,

it must be regulated by government
to ensure

the general benefit.

inquiry,

1'

6

The mercantilist scope of

as organized around the aggregation of
the

nation-state, suggests that individual domestic

exchange as merely

a

"vibration of wealth" between

transacting parties, does not, or rather, can not,
constitute

a

relevant and thereby detrimental form of

internal gain.

Aristotle's ambiguity with regard to

exchange is here avoided

B.

if often in a specious way.

The Eclipse of Exchange: The Physiocrats

Mercantilist thought affords

a

calculation of

advantage which negates prior notions of individual
gain by shifting the focus of the exchange transaction

from individuals within states to international

commercial transactions.

This,

and not the familiar

emphasis in the literature of Smithean and post-

Smithean political economy which emphasizes limitations
to free-trade,

is the central significance of the

mercantilists to the task at hand.

Mercantilism,

however, was to be last expression of the classical

understanding of gain as accrued solely through the
exchange transaction.

The inauguration of classical

political economy in the eighteenth-century is marked
146

See Beer, Early British Economics
66

,

pp.

106-110.

by the rejection of this assumption

—

replacing

exchange as the theoretical pivot with
the notion of
production.
1*1

Although the idea of production, as
the
fabrication or creation of objects, is

longstanding,

V

148

AS M * r
riteS
Before th e Physiocrats, surplusI
that as profit
in the form of profit
was
explained purely from exchange the sale of
the
commodity above its value.” Theories of
Surplus Value
[Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1963],
p. 54).
And as
R<
1 writes
the problem of price and value was
l
hitherto
conceived almost exclusively in terms of
exchange.
With Aristotle and the Schoolmen it had been
part of the problem of justice... In the mercantilist
era both the question and answer were different.
With
all the obscurities and individual variations,
a common
approach underlay mercantilist theory on the question
o
price.
The approach was that of the merchant.
What
is the best means for making the country rich?
Because
wealth is the same as commercial capital (represented
by money) the answer is, by making profitable sales.
Profit can only arise upon alienation, i.e. in the act
of exchange, when the seller sells more dearly than he
has bought.
All the mercantilist conclusions relating
to foreign trade and their limited and distorted view
of the relation between money and prices are the
results of this approach." (Eric Roll, A History of
Economic Thought, p. 99.)

^ln.
a ue_

'

—

'

,

(

^

'

148 As the role of exchange was emphasized by the
mercantilists, the role of production was diminished
when not presented as merely a means to the end of
exchange: "The more a manufacture causes money to pass
from one hand to another (which we call exchange) the
more useful it is to the country." (F.W. von Schrotter,
as quoted in Heckscher, Mercantilism , vol. II, p. 208)
Production was even in some instances regarded as an
impediment to the economic process. Not only, as
Schrotter tells us, should money "always remain in
circulation" but "neither should it pass into such
manufacture where it is immediately destroyed and not
brought back into use." (Heckscher, Mercantilism vol.
II, p. 208).
Here the assumption is that manufacture
does not produce, but to the contrary, somehow consumes
money by stripping away its exchange-value, thereby
.
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the central point of origin for
classical political

economic thought was the elevation of this
concept into
a central analytical position. 149
Production
as the

center of economic analysis signified the end
of a
perception of a world of finite economic goods in

which

the gain of one was the loss of another; here
the

limits of a zero-sum economics as well as the
finite

stasis represented by

a

"neutral" transfer of domestic

wealth from person to person, could potentially be

creating an absolute use-value by which this form of
consumption' annihilates the object. Mun's position,
though less extreme, is likewise an example of this
impulse, as he argues that a nation can increase its
wealth if money is regularly converted into goods and
if these commodities are transformed back into money.
England's Treasure by Foreign Trade p. 23)
This
preference for exchange, as represented in and confused
with its nominal money form, over manufacture as the
source of gain is found in another aspect of
mercantilist literature. This is, as Heckscher calls
it, a "fear of goods," the "nearly compulsive" concern
with selling which characterized mercantilist thought.
As Johann Joachim Becker writes, "it is always better
to sell goods to others than to buy goods from others,
for the former brings a certain advantage and the
latter inevitable damage."
(Quoted in Heckscher,
Mercantilism, vol. II, p. 116).
Finally, it is
fascinating to note the mercantilist preoccupation
with alchemy, a "science" which held the promise of the
"production" of the source of nominal wealth -- gold.
Becker and Schrotter themselves number among the group
that regarded this means as a desirable possibility for
the acquisition of bullion.
(

,

.

149 Gianni Vaggi writes, "The idea that trade cannot
originate wealth had never been proposed before
Quesnay; not even by authors like Cantillon, who were
not Mercantilists and who never particularly stressed
the influence of trade on the welfare of nations." (The
Economics of Frangois Quesnay [Durham: Duke University

Press,

1987]

,

p.

43)

68

,

overcome.

The very nature of gain thus
stood to be

recast given the possibility of the
creation of real
15
wealth.
Conterminously, this suggests that goods
need not be sold above their value in order
for a

profit to be accrued. 151
The turn into the classical phase of modern

political economy and its emphasis on production -an
emphasis which will remain until the inception of
"neoclassical" marginal-utility theory in the late 19th

century -- originates at the hands of the French
physiocrats.

Frangois Quesnay's Tableau Economique,

marks this turn.

The Tableau Economique

representation of the economic domain as

a

,

the first

whole,

is

organized around the separation of two processes -- the

150 Cf. Schumpeter s discussion of the Physiocrats and
Quesnay in History of Economic Analysis
'

.

The assumption of commodities as sold at their
"real” value is, for example, mandatory to the Marxian
explanation of profit. As Maurice Dobbs writes, "Gains
of chance or of individual 'sharp-practice’ could exert
no permanent influence in a regime of 'normal
values'... at most this could explain individual gains
and losses among the class of capitalists." ("Classical
Political Economy and Marx, " in Marx and Modern
Economics, ed. David Horowitz, [New York: MacGibbon &
151

Kee,

1968]

,

pp.

52-53)

.

152 Alfred Marshall writes that the physiocrats
represent "the first systematic attempt to form an
economic science."
Principles of Economics [1890]
[London: Macmillan, 1972], p. 625).
See also, J.R.
McCulloch, Principles of Political Economy [1825]
(London: John Murray, 1870)
p. 30, and Schumpeter,
History of Economic Analysis pp. 242-30.
(

,
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production of the "annual produce"

and exchange, which

is pursued in a supplementary
stage as "circulation."

According to the physiocrats, production
does not
revolve around the process of manufacture;

"Industrial

work

as Quesnay avers,

As we are told,

"does not increase wealth." 153

the "artisan destroys in the form of

subsistence as much as he produces by his labour." 154
The starting point of the physiocrats’
emphasis on

production poses the source of all gain instead in
the
fundamental fecundity of agriculture: "land is the
unique source of wealth, and... it is agriculture
that
causes wealth to increase."

1

"

The category of

agriculture appears to afford an analytical benefit by

153
Frangois Quesnay, "Corn," in Ronald L. Meek, The
Economics of Physiocracy: Essays and Translations
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963), p. 72.
154
Quesnay, "Corn", quoted in Meek, Economics of
Physiocracy, p. 73.

155
Quesnay, "General Maxims", in Meek, Economics of
Physiocracy, p. 232.
Quesnay was the first to cast
productivity only in terms of agriculture. Previously,
the relation was conceived as a form of "par" or rate
of correspondence between land and labour.
Quesnay
established a hierarchical relationship between the two
elements in which land alone accounted for the increase
in real wealth.
Of course, the physiocratic focus on
agriculture is a function of the actual basis of
economic activity in France. Manufacture was not to
assume an analytical role until the British engaged the
discussion. (See also Meek, Economics of Physiocracy,
pp. 379-382 for a discussion of this "exclusive
productivity" with regard to existing social and
political conditions.)
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providing the most patent representation
of "clear
gain" or surplus as distinguishable from
circulation.
To wit:

the amount of food consumed by the laborer
plus

what is used on seed is on the average less
than the
amount of produce raised. 156
Now,

useful,

despite the fact that exchange is considered
often absolutely necessary

along with manufacture, as sterile.

"
,

157

explanations of the Tableau Economique
us that "trade

..

it is identified,

In the
,

Quesnay tells

.multiplies sales and purchases without

multiplying things, and.

..

represents nothing but an

addition to sterile expenditure." 158

According to

Quesnay, because exchange represents a mere transfer of
goods,

exchange always entails the transfer of

commodities of equal value.

As we are told,

it is

impossible that gain could be created from exchange,
for no one would exchange a commodity for another of

inferior value:
equal value,

"

trade is only an exchange of value for

and... so far as these values are concerned

there is neither loss nor gain as between the

Theories of Surplus Value, vol.

156

Marx,

157

See Vaggi,

I,

p.

44.

Economics of Frangois Quesnay, pp. 42-

45.

Quesnay, from the "Second Edition of the Tableau,
158
in Meek, Economics of Physiocracy, pp. 119 and 130.
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contracting parties.—

This relegation of exchange to

an auxiliary status approximates the
mercantilist

notion of domestic gain as
within

a

mere "vibration" of wealth

country and thus, as not contributing to

a

a net

surplus, performing a purely mechanical
distributive

function. 160
This description of exchange falls into one
of
two general categories of exchange articulated
by the

Physiocrats: that of resale trade, le commerce de

revendeur

This category of transaction, according

.

to Quesnay,

can not alter the value of a commodity and

therefore renders such exchanges "sterile." 162
to say,

"As with money,

This is

the products exchanged exist

before they start to circulate among individuals.

The

process of resale does not affect their physical

quantities

"

163

.

159 Quesnay, "Dialogue on the Work of Artisans," in
Meek, Economics of Physiocracy, p. 214.
160
See Quesnay, "Men," in Meek, Economics of
Physiocracy,
pp. 92-3.
161

Vaggi,

Economics of Francois Quesnay, p. 44.

The use of sterile is related to the Physiocratic
division of society into two fundamental classes -productive and unproductive.
(See Meek, Economics of
Physiocracy, pp. 150-8)
162

163 Vaggi, Economics of Francois Quesnay, pp. 44-6.
Such an argument is not an uncommon expression of
suspicion toward exchange as a means to profit without
value-addition. Hence the legitimacy of "production"
(Here value is
which adds tangible value to a good.
assumed to be an expression of "physical qualities."
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The other category of exchange is
that of "sales
at first-hand,"

vente de la premiere main.

of the products of land,

The prices

the Physiocrats argue,

are

only determined on this first-hand market;
likewise,

first-hand sales are associated with the
physiocratic
concept of "permanent" prices.
Quesnay,

As we are told by

"it is precisely by these sales that it is

possible to measure the value of the annual produce
of
the nation

s

wealth."

1

"'

1

Unique to the physiocrats, the

notion of first-hand sales refers to the transaction

between the producer and the merchant who initially
purchases the commodity.

It is only after commodities

have completed this initial exchange transaction that
the second category of resale exchange is entered.

Since the first category of exchange is defined as
not existing within the category of circulation proper,

but a part of the category of production, the

possibility of a clear division between the two
categories is negated; this is because physiocratic
"production" actually includes the initial act of

164
Quesnay, "Analysis," quoted in Vaggi, Economics of
Francois Quesnay, p. 41)
Mirabeau wholly defines
circulation in this way. As he writes, "here by
circulation we mean only the purchases first-hand."
(Vaggi, Economics of Francois Quesnay, p. 43)
For
further definitions of circulation also see Meek,
Economics of Physiocracy, p. 119.
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exchange.

This inclusion entails that
the allegedly

autonomous category of agricultural
production, the
self-contained foundation of the
system, can only be
ultimately defined as a function
of exchange.

In this

way,

exchange,

in the form of exchange-value,

contaminates the sovereignty of
production.
The difficulty in definitively
establishing

production as the autonomous source of
the economic
process is paralleled in Quesnay'
s governing dictum of
utility, or use.

It is subsistence,

as we are told,

which forms the foundation of society.

Accordingly,

the physiocrats' notion of utility emphasizes
the

particular physical characteristics of

a

commodity,

characteristics which make it suitable for the

satisfaction of

a

particular need.

Quesnay defines

general consumption" as that which "satisfies the

needs of life."

1

"

Such an assertion follows the

physiocratic definition of wealth, in opposition to

mercantilist thought, not as money but as tangible
goods.

However,

as we saw also with Aristotle,

construct of utility is likewise deployed as

a

the

means to

circumscribe the potential excesses of wealth:
"land.

.

.constitutes wealth only because of the fact

that its products are necessary to satisfy men's
165 And, "the foundation of society is the subsistence
of men." (Meek, Economics of Physiocracy, p. 55).
Cf.
Vaggi,
Economics of Francois Quesnay, p. 59.
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needs... and because it is these
needs themselves which
are the basis of wealth."*”
And, via the same
sollipcism, it is a means of defining
exchange:
the action of exchange ... is only
necessary to

satisfy the need which is itself the
cause of exchange.
One must then distinguish what is
only necessary from
what is productive." 167
The pairing of exchange with utility
is cast,

however,

in yet another form.

Quesnay maintains that

normal trading situations" are governed by
utility.

When regulated by utility, the exchange
transaction is

deemed to be always advantageous to both buyer and
seller.

Such a scenario occurs because, as it is

suggested, an individual will never exchange one

commodity against another unless convinced of
in utility.

Hence,

a

gain --

"one must always assume that it

[exchange]

is always profitable to both contracting

parties." 168

This is possible due to the fact that

utility deems that any given commodities can be
"enjoyed quite differently by different people" -thus creating a mutuality of gain.
166

Meek,

Economics of Physiocracy,

p.

84.

167
Quesnay, "Reponse au Memoire de M.H.," quoted in
Vaggi,
The Economics of Francois Quesnay p. 45.
,

168
Quesnay, "On the Work of Artisans," quoted in
Vaggi, The Economics of Francois Quesnay, p. 60. (Cf.
Meek's somewhat convoluted version of this passage, The
Economics of Physiocracy, p. 214).
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The problem with this description
of a transaction

commodity for commodity

—

is that it implies a

situation of barter, not an exchange
mediated by money.
For the Quesnay, this is a tricky
element to introduce
because, as noted, the physiocrats
attempt to shift
away from defining wealth through
money to defining it
terms of useful goods. As we are
nonetheless told,

m
m

order to achieve the form of wealth,
agricultural

goods must become commercables

value exists as

a

169
.

So,

although use-

condition for the exchangibility of

a

commodity, the amount of wealth measured in
exchange

depends solely upon the exchange-value of the
commodity.

1

'

That is, only the exchange-value of a

commodity can be used as
wealth embodied in it,

1

a

measure of the amount of

and use value is here revealed

as thus only a prerequisite to exchange value.

The

169 See Vaggi, Economics of Francois Quesnay p. 40
and Meek, The Economics of Physiocracy, pp. 89-91.
,

170 Meek, The Economics of Physiocracy, p. 90.
The
difficult proximity between the two crops up at nearly
every turn. In this instance, the context is the
attempt to define the "wealth" in its non-nominal form:
"If a kingdom is poor, that is not, as is vulgarly
claimed, because it lacks money, but because it lacks
exchangeable wealth." (Meek, The Economics of
Physiocracy, p. 92)
171
Quesnay, "Maxims," quoted in Meek,
of Physiocracy, p. 235.
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emergence of wealth from the
process of production can
thus only become fully
manifest within the exchange
transaction.
The relation of exchange,
as

I

am suggesting,

indicates the point at which the
physiocratic structure
is at its most vulnerable.
This becomes all the more
clear in a third example.
In dividing acts of exchange
into two categories, Merciere
de la Riviere
writes,

"a

man trafique when he buys and
resells the commodities
which originally belonged to other
men ; a man commerce
when he obtains from his own land the
commodities which
he exchanges against some other values." 172
The ambiguity between the two posited
categories
of exchange

—

"first-hand" versus "retail" sale

—

is

here expressed not through the categories
of exchange

per

se,

but through a specific class of exchangers --

the merchants.

Given the preeminence granted to

production in the creation of surplus and the lack of

a

possibility of surplus in the second-hand market, the
interjection of the merchant appears surprising,

a

second-order element of an already diminished role of
exchange.

Merchants, as Quesnay tells us, necessarily

operate in the "first-hand" market,

172

a

market linking

Quoted in Vaggi, Economics of Francois Quesnay,
77

p.

.

producers of commodities and the
purchasers, 173 as well
as playing a role in the
second-hand market. The
complaint runs thus: merchants take
advantage of their
"privileged position" in the process
of circulation and
"at the expense of either end of
transaction "
,

operating only in their own interest
which is "always
that of buying as cheap as possible
and selling as dear
as possible." 174
Riviere also warns us of the merchant
as the
agent intermedaire who keeps for himself
ten

measures on your corn and the same on my
wine." 175

The

gain of the merchant does not only neglect
to

contribute to, but rather diminishes the surplus
product,

the produit net, of the nation.

Therefore,

the interest of the majority of traders stand
opposed
to those of the majority of citizens. 176
173
68

See Vaggi, Economics of Francois Quesnay,
pp. 66-

.

174

Vaggi, Economics of Francois Quesnay, p.
(italics added)

67.

175 Quoted in Vaggi, The Economics of Francois
Quesnay, p. 67.
The merchants thus interpose
themselves between the producer and the final consumer:
"Their activity is not limited to the mere
transportation of products from town to country and
province to province nor is it sporadic or unusual."
Economics of Francois Quesnay, p. 66)
(

.

176 Mirabeau adopts a less acrimonious tone. In any
society, as he writes, "people compete against one
another for their survival and enjoyment; everybody
tries to acquire goods for himself ... Each man tries to
satisfy his needs while minimizing his expenses and
toil." (Meek, The Economics of Physiocracy, pp. 21278

.

The merchant,

as so positioned in the
physiocratic

analysis, characterizes a recurring
problem: the

difficulty of theorizing

a full

separation between the

vaunted sphere of production and the
realm of exchange.
The merchant, in effect, performs
a neat traversal of
the two carefully constructed
production/exchange

categories

and as it seems, becomes a scapegoat for

the potentia of adventitious gain,

as falling outside

the construction of "real wealth" as produced
through

agriculture
The stakes which seem to underlie the attempt
to

cordon off the excessive elements by establishing one

particular form or location as the seat of
excessiveness or adventitiousness,

1

not only indicate

the ambiguity between forms of exchange, but

demonstrates a fundamental structural deficiency in the
Physiocrats' claim to analytical comprehensiveness.

Because an excess as "surplus" can exist only to the
extent that it is granted expression within the Tableau
-- rooted,

that is,

in the production/first-hand

exchange classification -- gain existing outside the

produit net cannot be represented.

The ambiguous

A forthcoming project will argue that much of the
history of anti-semitism is related to this general
ambiguity.
177
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excess of exchange, here cast
in terms of the gain of
the merchant, thus outdoes
or exceeds the analytical
totality attempted by the Tableau
Economique.

The significance attributed
to the physiocratic

programme by the history of economic
thought, namely,
the analytical shift to production
as the
founding

principle of analysis, masks an old
proclivity.

The

Physiocratic preoccupation with surplus
garnered from
nature, not from one's fellow citizens,
reflects an

alternative solution to the uncertain character
of
material acquisition.
To pose land as a selfsufficient entity in the origin of gain is to

constitute
autonomous

a

"surplus" sui generis; as it is an
"free gift" of nature, recounting

Aristotle's ideal form of chremistike.

The isolation

of an agricultural surplus succeeds precisely as a form
of a foreclosure on the difficulties of acquisition by

exchange; namely, that of a potentially unequal

acquisition exacted from one's fellows.

Physiocratic

"gain" as a function of both "natural" abundance and

production, casts a category of surplus as

positivity.

a

pure

This is to say, no transgressive elements

are in excess of the produit net

—

difficulties posed by exchange.

The resort to exchange

80

other than the

as a means of defining
production marks the weak point

Of the Tableau by posing the
allegedly autonomous

category of agricultural production,
the self-contained
sine qua non of the system, as
ultimately beholden to
the still errant exchange function.

81

.

CHAPTER III

ADAM SMITH AND THE TRANSMOGRIFICATION
OF EXCHANGE
A.

Production and " Universal Opulence"The Division ol Labor
~

A s Previously suggested, the idea of
production,
situated as the new pivot of economic
analysis,

signified the end of

a

perception of

world of finite

a

economic goods in which the gain of one
entailed the
loss of another.
Adam Smith, who follows the

physiocrats in asserting production as the reigning
element of economic analysis, is responsible for
the
most innovative, and by any count, the most successful

modification of the notion of exchange.

In Smith's

epochal Wealth of Nations, the issues associated with

exchange undergo prodigious changes.

construction of

a

An account of the

transmuted understanding of

individual pecuniary gain begins with the notion which

inaugurates the Wealth of Nations r the division of
labor

As his organizing feature of production. Smith

opens the Wealth of Nations with the concept of the

division of labor.

Broadly defined as the separation

of a process of production into parts,

each of which is

carried on by a separate person, the concept of the
82

division of labor may be traced
from its most
rudimentary forms in classical
178
Greece.

it is Smith's

emphasis on the division of labor,
however, which makes
his account so extraordinary.
As Joseph Schumpeter
remarks, "nobody, either before or
after A. Smith ever
thought of putting such a burden
upon the division of
labor... With A. Smith it is practically
the only factor
in economic progress." 179
The prodigious increase in guantity
of work

provided by the division of labor according
to Smith,
is due to three factors: an increase
in dexterity of
the workman,

saving of time commonly lost in

178
The concept of the division of labor as the
specialization of work processes may be traced from
Xenophon, through Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas, Luther,
Thomas Mun, John Locke, and Bernard Mandeville.
(See
Cannan s account in A Review of Economic Theory and
Bonar's summary in Philosophy and Economics)
The
concept is also to be found in works in which the
economic aspect is not so pronounced; for example, in
the writings of Hegel
Philosophy of Right) and
Schiller The Aesthetic Education of Man). The
division of labor was revived in the English economic
literature at the latter portion of the 17th century,
in Sir William Petty's 1671 Political Arithmetick.
.

(

(

179 Schumpeter, History of Economic Analysis, p. 187.
As elsewhere noted, it is "Smith's emphasis on the
division of labor as a factor in growth via its
enormous influence on productivity which makes his
treatment of the subject so original."
(The New
Palgrave : A Dictionary of Political Economy [London:
Macmillan Press, 1987], s.v. "division of labor"). Cf.
Marx, Capital, vol. I, p. 348, nt. 4.
83
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’sauntering’

from one species of work to
another and
the invention of new machinery
by workmen. 180
The

emphasis Smith places upon these
three claims for the
division of labor have been vigorously
contested by one
of Smith's greatest admirers,
Dugald Stewart. 181
First,

although Stewart acknowledges that

a

worker

increases dexterity by engaging only one
task, he
argues that the actual gain is limited.
"The advantage
gained by the division of labor," Stewart
writes
...bears so very small a proportion to that
which
is gained in the last result, that
it is by no
means entitled to stand at the head of the

enumeration; and certainly goes a very little
length in accounting for that minute division
and
subdivision of labor which has been introduced into
some of the most prosperous manufactures of this
country. 182

Stewart thus agrees with Lauderdale "where he observes,
that even in the trade of the pin maker, without the

use of machinery to supersede the work of the hand, no

great progress could have been made in the rapidity

180
Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of
the Wealth of Nations [1776] ed. Edwin Cannan (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1976), pp. 11-14.
181
Stewart begins his discussion of the division of
labor somewhat dryly: "The observation, that ’A Jack of
all trades is master of none', is one of those maxims
of common sense which the slightest survey of human
life forces on the most careless observer."
(Lectures
on Political Economy [1855] [New York: Augustus M.
Kelley, 1968]
pp. 310-11)
,

182

Stewart, Lectures on Political Economy, p. 315.
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with which pins are formed."

1

*3

With regard to Smith's

second point, while it was true
that to some extent
time was saved by the worker not
changing tasks,
Stewart notes that "the economy of
time gained in this
way must plainly bear a still more
inconsiderable

proportion than the former, to the
magnitudes of the
effect which it is brought to explain." 184

As for the

third factor, the invention of machinery,
Stewart

acknowledges that the division of labor does
indeed
spur mechanical innovation, but, as he
points out,
Smith

s

single proof of the boy who improves

a

steam

engine in order to acquire more play-time, is

extremely unsatisfactory."
suggests,

Such invention, Stewart

is unlikely because the effect would not

necessarily shorten the work day for the inventor;
moreover,
183

it could well lead to the loss of a job.

185

Stewart, Lectures on Political Economy, p. 315.

184
Stewart, Lectures on Political Economy, p. 315.
John Rae Statement of Some New Principles on the
Subject of Political Economy [1834] [New York: Augustus
M Kelle Y' 1964]) regarded savings in tools as far more
significant than time saved. Variations on these
criticisms are echoed in the work of other 19th century
writers such as Charles Babbage {On the Economy of
Machinery and Manufactures [Philadelphia: Carey & Lea,
1832]) and Andrew Ure
Philosophy of Manufacture [1835]
[London: Cass, 1967]).
(

:

(

185
And,

Stewart, Lectures on Political Economy, p. 318.
as Hegel writes, as the division of labor makes
"work more and more mechanical .. .man is able to step
aside and install machines in his place."
Philosophy
of Right [New York: Oxford Press, 1952], p. 129}.
See
also Andrew Ure, The Philosophy of Manufactures
(
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Moreover, the division of labor
relies upon the
principle of a single simple
function, whereas
mechanical innovation requires
considerably broader
knowledge.
The origin of innovation,
Stewart
concludes, is thus not to be found
in
"living
automatons, who are employed in the
details of the
1,186
work
According to Stewart, it not the worker
but
the employer or "speculative observer"
who
is

significant to the process of innovation. 187
These three advantages derived from
the division of
labor by Smith are all associated with
the division of
labor in production.

In Smith’s terminology,

this

division of labor in what he refers to as the
"trifling

manufactures"

is where the effects of the division of

labor are most readily understood:
the important business of making a pin is... divided
into about eighteen distinct operations ... Each
person, therefore, making a tenth part of a fortyeight thousand pins, might be considered as making
four thousand eight hundred pins in a day. 188

186

Stewart,

Lectures on Political Economy,

p.

318.

187
Stewart, Lectures on Political Economy, p. 318.
"spectator" that workmen "are placed under the view
of..." is mentioned at Wealth of Nations, p. 8.

A

188
Smith, Wealth of Nations, pp. 8-9.
In every other
art and manufacture, we are told, "the effects of the
division of labor are the same, resulting in a
"proportionable increase in the productive powers of
labor
.
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This characterization of the
division of labor,
however, is not sustained
throughout Smith's account.
A second form is present, a form
referred to as the
"social" division of labor.
this form, the division
of labor is posed in terms of
a broader function in
which the emphasis is on the exchange
of the

m

commodities between commodity owners. 189

Smith's term

for this is "great" as opposed
to "trifling"

manufactures —those which supply "the
great wants of
the great body of people." As we
are told,
...every different branch of the work
employs so
great a number of workmen, that it is
impossible to
collect them all into the same workhouse.
We
seldom see more, at one time, than those
employed
in one single branch.
Though in such manufactures,
therefore, the work may really be divided into
a
much greater number of parts, than in those
of a
more trifling nature, the division is not near
so
obvious, and has been accordingly been much less
observed. 190
189 The use of the term "social" with regard to
a
second category of the division of labor is commonly
found in the Marxian context.
The distinction between
the social division of labor by commodity exchange and
its division within the labor process for which
exchange does not intervene, is crucial for Marx.
Smith s neglect in clearly making this distinction is
discussed in section four of the chapter on the
division of labor, in volume I of Capital. Smith, of
course, is here not alone, for the collapse of this
distinction within the division of labor marks all of
classical and neoclassical economic thought.
190
Smith, Wealth of Nations, p. 8.
This statement
leads Marx (who inserts his own parenthetical
exclamation mark at the end of the quote) to argue that
for Smith, the difference between the division of labor
in production and in society as a whole was "merely
87

Two contrary tendencies are
thus found in the two
unclarified forms of the division
of labor

—

tendencies which underscore the
apparent existence of a
breach between the claims for the
division of labor and
the actual gains in productivity.

In one instance,

the

reigning principle of (an increase in)
production is
fundamentally associated with the division

of labor in

production -- the production of the single,
tangible
commodity.
This "preference," as David Levine
phrases
it, serves to "obliterate the
exchange relations which
tie together the elements of the division
of labor";
consequently, different manufactures are simply
parts
of one great manufacture" and the presence
of exchange

becomes merely one of form. 191

The two forms of the

division of labor, as functions of production, on the
one hand,

and exchange, on the other, confront one

another in the passage where Smith describes how
"universal opulence" occurs as an outcome of the

division of labor:

subjective," that is,
existing "merely for the
observer." (Capital, vol. I, p. 354). Cf. Ronald Meek,
Studies in the Labor Theory of Value (London: Lawrence
& Wishart, 1973), p. 61.
191
David P. Levine, Economic Studies: Contributions
to the Critique of Political Economy (Boston: Routledge
& Kegan Paul, 1977), p. 46 and p. 37, respectively.
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Every workman has a great cruant
-t-v of
W ° rk
to dispose of beyond what
he himself has
for; and every other workman
being in exactlv Jhe
he iS enabled to exchange
a ^reat
quantity
auantftv'ofT'
of his own goods for a great
mianH?,,
what amounts to the same thing,
for the price if a'
great quantity of theirs. He
supplies
them
abundantly with what they have
occasion
for and
they accommodate him as amply
with what he has
occasion for, and a general plenty
diffuses itself
through all the different ranks
i

•

y,

of society?^

To suggest that every workman
has "a great quantity of

his own work to dispose of," and
that every other is in
"exactly the same situation," is to
negate the division
of labor in production which is
central to Smith’s
argument in the Wealth of Nations 193 in
other words,
,

the piecemeal role played by the worker
in the

fabrication of commodities is not applicable
to the act
of exchange, which presumes full ownership
as the

prerequisite of the transaction. 194
In the section which follows,

Smith’s fundamental

investiture in the division of labor in production, on
one hand, and his subsequent ambivalence with regard
to
192

Smith,

193

Cf.

Wealth of Nations, p. 15.

Levine,

Economic Studies, p. 44.

194
See Marx’s examples at the beginning of his
chapter on the division of labor which usefully
distinguish between the varying forms of pre-capitalist
and pre-industrial manufacture as opposed to later
capitalist forms.
Capital vol. I, pp. 337-338).
Of
course, many pre-capitalist forms of the division of
labor did themselves not meet the criteria which Smith
indicates -- that of an independent artisan-producer
who has full ownership of an object.
(
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"

the less prominent "social" or
exchange form of the
division of labor, is resolved in
an astonishing
manner.
In the final portion of the
first chapter we
find the oft-quoted passage inviting
us to ponder the
material world of the laborer;
...the different parts of his dress
and his
household furniture, the course linen

shirt which

hl

skin, the shoes which cover
J
the bed which
he lies on... the kitchen

his feet,
grate upon which he prepares his victuals.
,

No less,

our attention is directed to the coal
with

which he prepares his food "dug from the
bowels of the
earth and brought to him by a long sea and a

long land

carriage.

19s

The extraordinary things about this

passage is that although phrased in terms of the
"advantages" of the single laborer, the picturesque

language admits of no individual exertion.

somehow "dug,

"

and,

Objects are

whilst the common man awaits, these

objects are directly "brought" to him

manner of arduous difficulty.

—

despite all

Not only is the laborer

distanced from the principle of labor, but also from
the requirements of exchange.

Hence,

the heady and

vertiginous sense evoked by the passage.
Smith's phrasing may be fruitfully compared to

a

similar passage in Bernard Mandeville's Fable of the
Bees with regard to the procurement of goods.
195

Smith,

Wealth of Nations, p. 16.
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In this

passage, „e are invited to
"reflect on the toil and
hazard that are to be undergone
abroad, the vast seas
we are to go over, the
different climates we are to
endure, and the several nations
we must be obliged to
for their assistance." 196

Mandeville

'

s

account, we may note, does not

produce the same effect as Smith's;
it is more
continent, as anchored by not only
the sobering mention
of obligation," but a string
of pronouns.
In Smith's
version, "we" are ever so far from
the scene of the

factory

—

suspended,

as it were,

in a nether realm

between the two forms of the division
of labor.
idea of "opulence" in this scenario
takes on

inflection

new

as pure gratis it creates a new and

extraordinary form of absolute surplus.
account,

a

The

In Smith's

the humble objects of "opulence," outflank

both direct labor and exchange, appearing, as it
were,
out of thin air.

One lacks immediate obligation to

one's fellows, and matter itself is made to exude an

almost mysterious atmosphere

—

mere coal, linen

shirts and stove-grates become objects worthy of

astonishment.

This mis-en-scene depicting an

indisputably ideal expression of both production and
196 Mandeville, The Fable of the Bees: Or Private
Vices , Publick Benefits [1732] vol. II (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1924), p. 335. Compare also to
Locke's discussion of the division of labor in "Civil
Government", §43.
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exchange through their absolute
negation, overwhelming
both issues of magnitude and
the awkward relation
between the division of labor in
production and the
division of labor expressing
itself through exchange.
Indeed,

an alternate variant of an
invisible hand is
here suggested, a resolution
of plot complexities, a
deus ex machina.
Through such

macrological

super addition,

the worker,

the common man, here somehow

obtains something for nothing,

a

strange turn indeed on

the "unearned increment" of
capitalist production.
in
this apotheosis of the division of
labor, labor itself
is transmogrified,

or rather,

completely transcended.

The passage with which Smith closes
the chapter

likewise contains hyperbole of some
significance:
...if we examine, I say, all these things,
and
consider what a variety of labor is employed
about
each of them, we shall be sensible that without
the
assistance and co-operation of many thousands,
the
very meanest person in a civilized country
could
not be provided, even according to what we very
falsely imagine, the easy and simple manner in
which he is commonly accommodated. Compared
indeed, with the more extravagant luxury of the
great, his accommodation must no doubt appear
extremely simple and easy, and yet it may be true,
perhaps, that the accommodation of an European
prince does not always so much exceed that of an
industrious and frugal peasant, as the
accommodation of the latter exceeds that of many an
African King, the absolute master of the lives and
liberties of ten thousand naked savages. 197

197

Smith,

Wealth of Nations
92

,

p.

16.

.

The hyperbolic language is,
again, symptomatic of the
limitations and difficulties of
the chapter at large,
While the nature of the "opulence
which extends to all
classes" here takes another turn.
A strange atmosphere
is at work
only a few sentences have
elapsed since
it was established that the
"most mean" had at one's
disposal the labor of hundreds, nay,
thousands.

-

Now,

the "meanest of persons," who in
the prior passage
did not need to divest in order to
receive, nor labor

m

order to possess, is now positioned
in a sphere in
which economic "opulence" runs closely
alongside a form
of dominion

"absolute mastery."

Through this

juxtaposition, there is a suggestive blurring
between
the authority of rulership and that
authority conferred

by the "command" of objects.
of thousands,

As availed by the labor

the priveledged notions of "cooperation

and assistance" are,

in the final instance, posed in a

language that is strikingly autocratic. 198

The notion of production as the pivot of economic

analysis lays the ground for

a

material world that is

no longer constituted by a finite set of objects which
198
An interesting parallel may be drawn between the
rhetorical tone of the above passage and the position,
held in some quarters, that Smith's labor theory of
value is essentially a theory of the disutility of
labor.
See for example, Marian Bowley, Studies in the
History of Economic Theory Before 1870 (London:
Macmillan Press, 1973)
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are to be contested at the
expense of one another, but
a realm of potentia in which
all possess the capacity
to gain, as conferred by the
essential quality of
labor
in the Wealth of Nations
the division of
labor is made to assume the burden
of the concept of
,

production en toto.
The division of labor in production,
which,

argued,

is necessarily a form of incrementalism,

as
is

conceptually contrary to Smith’s tendency in
this
chapter to emphasize the absolute and
universal idea of
opulence" -- the pivotal promise of the Wealth
of

Nations.

In other words,

this gap between the form and

the content of the chapter is also the breach
between
an ideal of absolute magnitude and the limits
of

incremental necessity.

The ability of the division of

labor to shoulder the larger claims of the Wealth of

Nations is thus, as suggested, arguable.

The

conceptualization of the division of labor must, for
this very reason, be fortified against further

potential diminution, as represented by the

vicissitudes of exchange as the necessary and defining

characteristic of the "social" division of labor --

opposed to that which is autonomous.

Once again,

as

the

199 As opposed to the mercantilists who only regarded
the "objective essence of wealth" (money), Smith, as
Marx writes, discovered in labor the "subjective
essence of wealth."
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.

ideal of production is rendered
structurally and

conceptually ambiguous because of the
necessary entry
into the social form.
On one hand,

Smith initially resists acknowledging

fully the social division of labor,

in instances we

have noted above. However, the social
division of labor
serves a specific, if understated, purpose.
As

conceived as a mere formal distributive element,
this
form of social transaction serves as a
bulwark

for a

significant part of Smith’s argument.

Namely, the

presentation of wealth as an "opulence" which is
universal,

Now,

that is to say, mutual and cooperative. 200

the appearance of exchange as a means to

reinforce the fundamental principle of mutuality can

only be so by assuming

a

form which is made to appear

specifically and solely as

a

function of simple

distribution; hence performing
function.

a

broadly "equalizing"

Suffice it to say that the category of

profit is nowhere sighted in this spontaniously

promulgated "universal opulence."
As we will recall,

quantity"

each individual has

("equal magnitudes")

to exchange

a

"great

("beyond

200 Halevy emphasizes Smith's use of the division of
labor as itself a demonstration of the "theorem of the
identity of interests."
The Growth of Philosophical
Radicalism, pp. 90-91)
(
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what he himself has occasion
for"). 201

However, the

function of distribution as so
connected with a general
"opulence" is only conceivable if
there exists neither
nominal forms of mediation, nor the
possibility of an
excessive individual incremental
remainder of exchange
of course, in this context the
later
is not a

problem because production has assumed
the preeminent
role previously allotted to exchange
while

the former

issue is simply not part of the
portrayal.

Although

Smith interjects the notion of price
into the above
passage, it will be noted that this already
presumes
that the labor theory of value is in
place; it is

inconsequential to the actual argument in this
chapter
and will not make its appearance until chapter
five.

Smith's appropriation of the language associated

with pure distribution -- that is, associated with
the
first paradigm of exchange which is only fully
enacted
as mutuality without individual gain,

through the

barter form -- is involved in one other way.

Namely,

that the nature of the "wealth" discussed is

characterized as not

a

monetary gain, but, as for

Quesnay, a gain in goods.

The magnification of the

qualities of certain quotidian commodities

—

the pin,

the linen shirt -- are telling of the preeminence

granted to this form of "wealth."
201

Smith,

Wealth of Nations, p. 15.
96

In short,

Smith's portrayal of exchange
presents

no trace of the possibility of
the excesses of
exchange; the numerical demands of
equal exchange are
absorbed, first, by the "universal
abundance" which

conditions the tone of the chapter, and,
when exchange
is invoked,

employs the vernacular of

barter form.

in this way,

a

distributive or

problematic excesses or

individual advantage are not to be found in
this

chapter -- only circulating magnitudes of
"abundance."

--

—Exchange

"
:

Of the Principle Which Gives Qcc as ion

to the Division of Labour"

As illustrated in the prior chapter, the division
of labor,

although asserted as

abundance,

tenuously

—

is positioned

source of

a

mutual

if at times somewhat

as the central productive factor in the

first chapter of
chapter,

a

Wealth of Nations.

In this initial

exchange is broadly positioned as

a

neutral

element of distribution -- as befits its secondary
status.
two,

For as we are told at the onset of chapter

the division of labour is the consequence of "the

propensity to truck, barter and exchange one thing for
another." 202

Smith's effort to craft

a

neutral role for

exchange which does not encroach upon the import of the

principle of production is underscored by the order of
202

Smith,

Wealth of Nations, p. 17.
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these first two chapters: despite
the fact that for
Smith, exchange conceptually
precedes the division of
labour, he places the chapter on
exchange after the

chapter treating the division of labor.

The same

impulse may be observed with regard
to the fact that no
direct mention of "exchange," the
principal subject of
Smith's second chapter, is permitted
to enter
into the

chapter's title,

"Of the Principle which gives
Occasion

—

to the Division of Labour"

an omission which serves

to likewise maintain the emphasis on
the reigning

principle,
The

"production."

propensity" to exchange, Smith tells us at

the beginning of chapter two,

is either "one of those

original principles in human nature, or... as seems
more

probable ... the necessary consequence of the faculties
of reason and speech.

"^ Ilj

function of "expediency"

Smith poses exchange as

—

a

we have simply not the time

"on every occasion" to venture other forms of appeal,

or to rely on the "benevolence" of others. 204

Such

expediency. Smith tells us in language echoing that of
the prior chapter,

is crucial due to the vast numbers

of persons with whom one necessarily transacts:

civilized society

[he]

"In

stands at all times in need of

203

Smith,

Wealth of Nations, P- 17.

204

Smith,

Wealth of Nations, P- 17.
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the cooperation and assistance of
great multitudes." 205
The human species is thus differentiated
from all

others "who seem to know neither this
nor any other
species of contracts." 206 To the degree
that animals
act in consort, it is merely the result
of an

"accidental concurrence of passions"; indeed,

"Nobody

ever saw a dog make a fair and deliberate
exchange of
one bone for another with another dog." 207

Smith associates the capacity for speech

specifically with the potential for persuasion.

The

introduction of persuasion appears to be not entirely
confluent with this context,

for it weakens Smith's

first portrayal of exchange,

as appearing in chapter

one,

as a spontaneous facilitation or rather,

diffusion

,

of "great opulence."

a

As enacted through

persuasion, one can not simply and instantaneously

205

Smith,

Wealth of Nations, p. 17.

206

Smith,

Wealth of Nations, p. 17.

207
Smith, Wealth of Nations, p. 18. Animals, bereft
of speech, and those humans who have nothing to
exchange, must resort to other "servile" means: "a
spaniel endeavors by a thousand attractions to engage
the attention of his master" while "Man sometimes uses
the same arts with his brethren... endeavor ing) by
every servile and fawning attention to obtain their
good will." (Smith, Wealth of Nations, p. 18).
(
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:

exchange,

rather,

one must be persuaded to exchange

—

despite the occasions provided by
the surpluses created
by the division of labor. 208
The notion of persuasion is
nonetheless pivotal to
the passage which is the famous
centerpiece of chapter
two

It is not from the benevolence
of the butcher,

the
rewer, or the baker, that we expect
our dinner
ut from their regard to their own
interest. We
address ourselves, not to their humanity
but to
eir
love, and never talk to them of our
own
necessities but of their advantages. 209

The astonishingly blunt pronouncement of
"self-love"

marks this passage as the scandal of the Smithian
corpus.

As a depiction of a willful assertion of self-

interest in the act of exchanging, this passage is

startling

not only for the vigorous assertion of

208
Smith, Wealth of Nations, p. 18.
The association
of the "expediency" of exchange with speech in this
particular form, appears to tax aspects of his account,
namely the very possibility of "expediency" itself.

209 Smith, Wealth of Nations, p. 18.
The significance
of this passage is described by Kenneth Lux, who sees
it as representing "The very core of Smith’s work, the
idea that is taken to be the essence of his
contribution... This statement is so important that it
could fairly well be said that if one were to choose a
statement that most characterizes the transition from
the thinking of the Middle Ages to that of modern
economic society, it would be this. It is this
statement that represents the epochal significance of
Adam Smith as a philosopher and as the fate of
economics." Adam Smith's Mistake: How a Moral
Philosopher Invented Economics and Ended Morality
[Boston: Shambhala, 1990], pp. 24-5).
(
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,

.

self-interest, but also because
of the context against
which this "self-love" is
juxtaposed. This is to say,
the objective of the
self-interest is indeed no more
than the simple procurement of
an evening meal,
a

modest intent situating "self-love"
in the service of a
most benign purpose.
Indeed, once the aim of the
transaction is perceived to be merely
mutton,

the

proclamation of "self-love" appears
rather puffed-up in
this otherwise minute drama.
The revelation of the aim of
the transaction,
however, lends no directive which
might illuminate a

fundamental obscurity; for it is quite
impossible to
ascertain from Smith's description if the
transaction
portrayed is mediated by coinage or if it
suggests a
barter transaction.
Smith has, however, already

signalled an indifference to such

a

distinction in the

very beginning of the chapter where he
quite speedily
by the second sentence, in fact -- collapses
the
ffsrent forms of exchange into one single

propensity": thusly "to truck, to barter and to

exchange." 210

Since each form is thus itself rendered

interchangeable, what sort of an equivalency, then, can

210
Smith, Wealth of Nations p. 17.
"Trucking" is
generally associated with the barter form: "trading by
exchange of commodities, barter... "truck-economy is
the term used to denote the period which precedes the
use of money." (Oxford English Dictionary, s.v

"truck"

)
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be said to exist within this
transaction,

in which the

only certain medium of exchange
involves the vagaries
of "persuasion"?
We may begin an answer to this
question by noting

that

m

Smith's depiction, we see none of the
common
pejorative connotations associated with
the role

persuasion may assume in an exchange transaction,
specifically, as some form of duplicity,
dishonesty or
sharp practice." This is because the
principal goal
of Smith's use of this notion is something
other than a

simple assertion of "self-love."

The significant point

is not so much the manipulation of the other

transactor
as,

s

perception of advantage to suit oneself,

more significantly, that it establishes

a

particular sort of identity between the two
transactors.

That money is omitted from Smith's

account of exchange

not only in this episode but

throughout the chapter -- is, in fact, fundamental to

grasping what

I

perceive to be the significance of this

portrayal of the exchange transaction.

Namely,

the

introduction of a version of adventitiousness rendered
autonomous from exchange-value

211
,

Were money to be

present in this encounter, the identity which Smith is

211
The single reference to money in this chapter is
dropped in an aside regarding the beggar who also
invariably trades the various objects of charity for
"lodging, food or money." (Wealth of Nations, p. 18).
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here suggesting could not be
established,

The subtle

tenor of barter, a provisioning and
distributive

expression of exchange conditioning the
known elements
of the transaction is therefore highly
significant.
The absence of money takes on an even
greater

significance

when compared to

a

passage from the

Lectures, a passage composed prior to the
writing of
the Wealth of Nations:
If we should inquire into the principle
in the
human mind on which this disposition of trucking
is
founded, it is clearly the natural inclination
every one has to persuade.
The offering of a
which to us appears to have so plain and
simple a meaning, is in reality offering an
argument to persuade one to do so and so as it is
for his interest. 212

In this discussion of the "disposition of trucking,"
we

find Smith explicitly and unhesitatingly asserting a

direct association between persuasion and the money
form

unlike the discretion exercised in the Wealth

of Nations.

As established in the first portion of this work,
the exchange relation,

as a transaction of two diverse

elements, whether object for object or object for
money,

can not effect a precise restitution.

212
Smith, Lectures on Jurisprudence (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1978), p. 352.
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One

exception was noted earlier, namely,
forms of symbolic
exchange occurring in particular indigenous
communities
by which identical objects are exchanged
in order
to

express the renunciation of self-interest. 213

in this

instance of exchanging same for same, the
economic or
distributive" goal of exchange is rendered
moot, along
with any possibility of an excessive remainder.
Smith

s

account of exchange, in a variant twist,

involves a material transaction, but he has
structured
it in such a way that it takes on an intangible

existence.

Smith presents us with a purely abstract

transaction, which, as creating an occasion for a

precise repetition, posits an absolute and irrefutable
equalization.

This "equalization," as effected by

the substitution of one's own "self-love" for that of

another, uses an intangible -- persuasion -- as the

medium of reflexivity.

Because the advantaging is

itself rendered as transactable it is therefore
neutralized.

Herein lies the origin, and indeed, the

very and possibility, of the famous solipcisms: "to
prevail is to interest another's self-love in one's own
favor" and "to show them that it is for their own

advantage to do for him what he requires of them." 214
In order to be rendered as non-excessive,

213

See above, p.

214

Smith,

1,

nt.

1.

Wealth of Nations, p. 18.
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the modality

Of exchange is thus cast in
an abstract form, creating
a matrix of transposition
through which an

interchangeable pseudo-economic
subject is created.
Here, the emphasis of the
transaction shifts

from the

matter transacted to the actors who
transact, and
consequently, the exchange transaction
is rendered
met a -economic
.

The removal of quantity from the
transaction is

aided by two implicit forms of exchange

-

forms which

are directly or indirectly associated
with the barter
form.
This innovative chapter is thus propped
up with
the most rudimentary forms of economic
practice.
These
elements, taken from the paradigm of exchange
as mutual

and beneficial, are subtle, but pervasive.

by reference to use-values,

One is cued

"necessities," mutton, as

well as the specious relevance of the inability
of dogs
to barter bones,

of

as well as the insertion of the medium

persuasion" as the pivot of the exchange

transaction.

Although these forms position exchange as

material transaction, the modality of exchange is thus

prevented from expressing itself in
assumes

a

a form which

social expression of quantitatively, that is,

exchange-value.

Through this removal of quantity in

the transaction,

the possibility of individual

pecuniary gain is likewise foreclosed.

105

Smith’s

insertion of self-advantaging is
notable (recall again
the hyperbole of the central
exchange passage) if,
as

the premise of the Health of
Nations asserts,

the

source of gain is not to be had
within the realm of
exchange but in that of production?
Through the dematerialization of
the exchange
transaction, which leaves only the
act of transacting,
it is demonstrated that the
exercise of such

propensities as

"interest" and "self-love" do not

culminate in individual advantage.

Through an emphasis

on the transaction as a purely formal
and mechanical

equation,

"mutuality" is redefined not in terms of

equal gain, but of the equal desire for gain.

"Advantage" is thus now not an unequal or unfair

quantity or increment, but
first instance,
in a second,

a

perception.

Thus,

in a

the transaction is unquantif iable; and,

the formal mechanism of a transactive

substitution carries the weight of the idea of exchange
qua transaction and not as matter transacted.

The

non-quantitative exchange transaction, under the
auspice of "production,
interchangibility, as

a

"

provides

a

matrix for this

portrayal of the harmonious

relation between self-interested transactors.
has executed a remarkable maneuver.
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Smith

He has secured not

.

only a new ground of "equalization"
in exchange, but
has introduced the idea of advantage
in such a way so
as to establish a contained
influence.
Smith’s stance in chapter two, and
the strain it
portends, becomes all the more evident
when juxtaposed
with the chapter which formally
introduces money to the
Wealth of Nations.
Because the portrayal of money as
an equalizing medium preserves the
issue of exchange as
an equilibrium removed from issues of
inequality or

disequilibrium,

it is unsurprising that money is

presented by Smith as simply

a

medium of exchange, by

which "necessities" and "wants" are met, traceable
along

a

single trajectory of function from salt, shells

and tobacco to metal coinage,

durability and divisibility. -1
are told,

to "avoid.

..

selected for its
"

It is

inconveniency.

instituted, we

1,216

Given what we have already seen, this

representation is not astonishing, as fitting with the
situation of exchange as itself performing

distributive or circulative function.
however,

chapter.

a

There is yet,

something of considerable interest in this
For all of Smith’s evasiveness with regard to

215 Smith, Wealth of Nations, p. 27.
In the second
chapter of Book II Smith will return to the topic of
money in a more detailed fashion, in order to more
directly counter particular mercantilist

presuppositions
216

Smith,

Wealth of Nations, p. 27.
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:

:

the presence of money in chapter
two,

remarkable to now witness

a

it is quite

retroactive

"clarification"
But when the division of labour first
place, -.his power of exchanging must began to take
frequently
ave been much clogged and embarrassed
in its
operations. One man, we shall suppose,
has more of
a certain commodity than he himself
has occasion
tor, while another has less. The
former would
consequently be glad to dispose of, and the
latter
to purchase, a part of this superfluity.
But if
this latter should chance to have nothing
that the
former stands in need of, no exchange can
be
made
between them. 217
We now return to the pivotal exchange scenario,
with

one primary modification:
exchange, persuasion,

the prior medium of the

is ejected.

Money is now

interjected as the mediating form, post facto
The butcher has more meat in his shop than he can
consume, and the brewer and the baker would each of
them be willing to purchase a part of it. But they
have nothing to offer in exchange, except the
respective productions of their respective trades
and the butcher is already provided with all the
bread and beer he has immediate occasion for. No
exchange can, in this case, be made between them. 218
In this discussion,

the role of persuasion,

unsurprisingly, is truant, and no possible means or

suggestion of "advantaging" is present.

The

retroactive insertion of the money form into chapter

217

Smith,

Weal th of Nations, P- 26.

218

Smith,

Weal th of Nations, P- 26.
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.

two underscores the obstructive
capacity of exchangevalue to Smith’s preeminent goal in
the first section
of the Wealth of Nations that is,
to establish a
,

foundation for "the doctrine of the mutuality
of
interests ” 219
.

C.

Barter and the Labor Theory of Value

Classical theories of exchange-value are, strictly
speaking, a means of imposing order upon exchange

beyond that which is granted by the nominal expression
of value, money.

Smith’s labor theory of value appears

as a means of directly employing the reigning
principle

of production to confine and define exchange-value.

Smith's theory of value, which asserts that value in

exchange is found in labor, and that only labor can

measure it, expresses Aristotle’s demand that the
objects exchanged be essentially, not merely

conventionally equalized. 220
The goal of equalization which such a theory

represents, however,

is a problem which Smith’s

emphasis on production as the source of gain has

ostensibly rendered moot.
219

Moreover,

such a theoretical

See above, p. 16.

Smith is credited by Marx for recognizing labor as
constitutive essence, the einfach subtanz of
commodities
220
the
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.

effort is not analytically congruent
with the work at
large.
As Schumpeter notes, Smith "wanted
a price
theory by which to establish certain
propositions that
do not require going into the
background of the value
phenomenon at all." 221 Given this, why
indeed is the

topic of value treated at all?

The labor theory of

value as presented by Smith in the Wealth
of Nations
serves,

first and foremost,

to reassert the primacy of

the principle of production as the origin
of all

wealth,

However,

as first advanced by the division of labor. 222

there could also be a second purpose.

chapter five of Book
formulations,

I,

In

Smith introduces his two basic

"labor embodied," a definition of value

through production, as defined through the labor

contained in an object; and secondly, "labor
221

Schumpeter, History of Economic Analysis

,

p.

22.

222
Smith, Wealth of Nations, p. 1.
As Eric Roll
writes, "The great advance in economic thought which is
due to Smith is the emancipation from mercantilist and
physiocratic fetters.
For two hundred years economists
had been searching for the ultimate source of wealth.
The mercantilists had found it in foreign trade.
The
physiocrats had gone further and had shifted the origin
of wealth from the sphere of exchange to that of
production.
But they had still remained confined
within one particular form of production, agriculture.
Adam Smith, building on the foundations of Petty and
Cantillon, effected the final revolution. With him
labour as such becomes the source of the fund which
originally supplies every nation." [A History of
Economic Thought, 3rd ed. [Englewood Cliffs, N.J.:
Prentice-Hall], p. 154).
See also Schumpeter, History
of Economic Analysis, p. 558, and Ronald Meek, Studies
in the Labour Theory of Value (New York: International
Publishers, 1956)
110

commanded,
that is,

a

definition of value through
exchange;

as the amount of labor one
can acquire through

the exchange of the object. 223

As Smith writes, all

value is rooted in an originary
act of labor and, as
such, value may be traced, if
at least in principle, to
this moment of origin:
What is bought with money or with
goods is
purchased by labour, as much as what
we acquire by
the toil of our own body. That
money or those goods
indeed save us this toil.
They contain the value
a
tain 5 uant ity of labour which we
exchange
^^ is supposed at the time to contain
for w
what
the
value of an equal quantity. Labour was
the first
price, the original purchase that was
paid for all
things. It was not by gold and silver
but bv
labour, that all the wealth of the world
was
originally purchased. 224
c

Here, production and exchange-value are
drawn by Smith

into an initial accord through an originary
act of
labor.

Although labor is "precisely equal" to

a

quantity of labour which it can enable one to purchase

223
Smith begins by again returning to an emphasis
upon the narrow capacity of each to fully furnish one's
"necessities and conveniencies" one is thus rich or
poor according to the quantity of labour one can
command , or one can afford to purchase.
"Once the
division of labour has thoroughly taken place, it is
but a very small part of these which a man's own labour
can provide him."
Wealth of Nations , p. 34).
;

(

224

Smith, Wealth of Nations , p. 34.
Cf. David Hume,
"everything in the world is purchased by labour". ("Of
Commerce," collected in Essays, ed. E. Miller
(Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1985)
.

Ill

:

or

command,

"

-

value is not commonly estimated
by

labour because of the difficulty
of measuring it.
The
different forms" of labour are therefore
adjusted to
one another not by a precise method,
but by a "higgling
and bargaining of the market... which
though not exact
is sufficient for carrying on the
business of common
life.

Secondly, because commodities are more

commonly exchanged for other commodities
than for
labour,

they are most commonly compared with

commodities
It is more natural, therefore, to estimate
[a
commodity s] exchangeable value by the quantity
of
some other commodity than by the labor which it
can
purchase. The greater part of people too understand
better what is meant by a quantity of a particular
commodity, than by a quantity of labour.
The one
is a plain palpable object; the other an abstract
notion, which, though it can be made sufficiently
intelligible, is not altogether so natural and
obvious 227
.

However, when "barter ceases" and "money has become the

common instrument of commerce, every particular

commodity is more frequently exchanged for money than
for any other commodity." 228

As Smith continues:

225

Smith,

Weal th of Nations, P- 35.

226

Smith,

Weal th of Nations, PP

227

Smith,

Weal th of Nations, P- 36.

228

.

35-36.

Smith, Weal th of Nations, P- 36. The comments
following this summation, however, could not have been
in any way anticipated
a second retroactive
incursion into the butcher-baker scenario. Again, the

—
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,

or of any other commodity
which^an
exchange for it. 229

e naa
be^ad

b ° Ur
in
in

The fundamental problem in
Smith's account is that
he performs a circular series
of assertions which fail
to define value-in-exchange
in terms of labor.

Instead,

one manifestation of exchange-value
is used to
measure another, only prompting a
return to the initial
problem.
In the end, the "real" price
of commodities
is also the price in labor; the
nominal price is the
price in money; and with regard to labor,
the "real"
price is the price in goods. 230
In the account of the labour theory
of value in

chapter six, we find another example of

exchange --

a

pre-currency

although unlike the account in chapter

absolute lack of a role for persuasion may be noted:
The butcher seldom carries his beef or mutton
to the
baker, or the brewer, in order to exchange them for
bread and beer; but he carries them to the market where
he exchanges them for money, and afterwards exchanges
that money for bread and for beer.
The quantity of
money which he gets for them regulates too the quantity
of bread and beer he can afterwards purchase." (Smith,
Wealth of Nations p. 36.)
229

Smith,

Wealth of Nations, p. 36.

230

Despite all, at the end of the discussion Smith
reasserts his position: because money varies in value,
labour is thus the only stable and unvarying factor
which enters into exchange.
Wealth of Nations, p. 37.)
The problems are, however, prohibitive enough for Smith
to use corn, not labor, in his actual analysis.
Wealth
of Nations, p. 43)
(

(

.
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two,

the transaction is clearly
demarcated as such,

existing

m

"that early and rude state of
society." 231

Smith's account in this chapter
provides a
demonstration that affords an alternative

attempt to

reconcile labour embodied and labor
commanded. As
Smith begins, "the proportion between
the quantities of
labour necessary for acquiring different
objects seems
to be the only circumstance which
can afford any rule
of exchanging them one for another." 232
Further,

If among a nation of hunters, for
instance it
usually costs twice the labour to kill a
w ich it does to kill a deer, one beaver beaver
should
naturally exchange for or be worth two deer.
It
is natural that what is usually the
produce of two
days or two hours' labour should be worth
double
of what is usually the produce of one
days' or one
hours labour.
In this state of things, the whole
produce of the labour belongs to the labourer;
and
the quantity of labour commonly employed in
acquiring or producing any commodity is the only
circumstance which can regulate the quantity of
labour which it ought commonly to purchase,
command or exchange for. 233

231

That is, which "precedes both the accumulation of
stock and the appropriation of land." (Smith, Wealth of
Nations, p. 43)
.

232

Smith,

Wealth of Nations, p. 53.

233
Smith, Wealth of Nations p. 54.
Cf. Schumpeter,
History of Economic Analysis, pp. 188-89, 310. In the
subsequent history of economic thought, the split
between labor embodied and labor commanded is carried
on by Ricardo and Malthus, respectively.
The third
direction of the analysis is the socialist critique of
the surplus extraction of labor.
,

114

.

view of an essential and
original economic condition
is here presented to the
reader via the barter form of
exchange
Exchange, expressed non-quantitatively,
creates
union of the labor embodied and
labor commanded

a

forms,

synthesis not fully enacted in
Smith's prior attempt
at reconciliation.
Transactivity no longer disrupts
the essence of production but
now is manifested in the
object, not as a theory of value,
but through the
blurring of production and exchange in
labor as a mixed
form of "acquisition." As permitted
by the absence of
a

quantitative forms, the barter transaction
absorbs
attendant deficiencies, difficulties, and
dissimilitudes.

Smith's essentialized labor in the

primordial state shows an ideal form of unmediated
acquisition, one that may be seen as somewhat of

a

companion to the strange fable of acquisition which
ends the discussion of the division of labor.

Moreover,

in this example we see barter sliding

imperceptibly into the sphere of pure opulence,

negotiating the [u]topos between production and
exchange, whereby a transmutation which includes and

exceeds the invariable slippage of the identity of
simple exchange is effected.

Blurring the spheres of

exchange and production, this evokes what for Aristotle

would be an ideal form of chremistike
115

.

.

Smith's theory of value asserts

a

''real"

exchangevalue in opposition to the
nominal expression of
exchange-value, which, as an independent
feature,

exists as mere "appearance."

The price mechanism,

which affords the structural
distributive schematic of
the Wealth of Nations, is the
structure which
takes up

the task,

after the terminus of the labor
theory of
value, of finding and representing
the exchange-value
("price") which is "real" to the
exclusion of the

spurious form.

The price mechanism does not thereby

absolutely treat the issue of exchange value
so much as
it effectively bisects it: one version
of value
in

exchange is mapped and defined within the
analytical
structure of the price mechanism, whereas the
other

expression of exchange-value, as left solely to

a

singular nominal expression, exists outside the matrix
and is thus rendered irrelevant to the broader

analysis

234

Several comments may be made with regard to the

relation between the labor theory of value, as the

234

See Thornstein Veblen's critique of the
"animistic" elements in Smith's use of the word "real."
("The Preconceptions of Economic Science," Journal of
Economics XIII, July 1899. Reprinted in Veblen, Marx,
Race, Science and Economics [New York: Capricorn Books,
1969]

)

.
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essential representation of
labour which is to provide
an equalizing order to the
exchange transaction, and
the price mechanism, the
actual analytical matrix of
the Wealth of Nations.
The classical pursuit of
theories of exchange-value, as we
saw, concerns itself
with the alignment of an exchange
transaction
into an

equalized symmetry in which disequilibrium
creates an
excessive remainder. Smith’s price
mechanism has as
its goal the sale at the "natural
price" which,

as the

economics textbooks attest, is the precise
value of
bringing the object to market. As Smith's
formula
runs: price = rent + wages

+

profit.

The "real" value

is thus worked out outside the immediate
exchange

transaction, posing an alternative to the strata
of

demands posed by the problems of fair exchange,
as

meted out to the labor theory of value. 235

The price-

mechanism defers the locus of the analysis outside the
exchange transaction; and with it the issue of
individual advantage.

As such, material gain is now

deferred into the market dynamic.
of the Smithean innovation.

This is the essence

No errant actual or

A detour which, as we noted above, is irrelevant
to Smith's structural innovation.
It nonetheless does
gesture, if with little success, to the old issue of
value-in-exchange. Exchange-value, as an analytical
category is to be altogether jettisoned from economic
analysis with the onset of the marginalist revolution.
(However, with regard to the role of the labor theory
of value in Smith, see Louis Dumont's excellent
commentary in From Mandeville to Marx)
235

.
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theoretical excess can register
because "price" now
incorporates "gain" in the form
of "profit"

—

precisely because it is now structurally
incorporated
as the "non-excessive excess"
of capital.
The relation between exchange
as such and the

price mechanism is marked in the
relation between
exchange-value and profit. Equalization

in exchange,

as we saw in the essentialized form
of the labor theory
of value, can not be maintained when
exchange-value in
the form of labor embodied is introduced
into the

scheme, which necessarily moves outside
of the barter
form.

In other words,

the labour theory of value

ultimately fails because it can not withstand
the
displacement into the representational realm,

a

displacement required if it is to assume the form of

exchange-value defined as "labor commanded."
As we also saw in chapter two of the Wealth

,

the

element of reflexivity allotted by the formal process
of the exchange relation is purely one of process or

action.

This transitivity of exchange,

to the express

exclusion of matter, permits the release of exchange
from the burden of quantitative equalization.

A

dematerialized exchange thus serves the most
rudimentary necessities of the constitution of profit.
In this regard,

component,

the failure of the quantitative

the labour theory of value,

118

is notably

.

fortuitous.

That is to say, the

definition of exchange

—

-

failure of one

as a quantitative value
form

enables the second manifestation
of exchange as pure
function
The very possibility of profit,

precisely as

a

therefore,

deferral of gain, relies on this
initial

(unsuccessful)

representational rupture of essential
production/exchange into the value form.
In this

sense,

profit also functions as the excess
of the
inequality of the exchange transaction;
although the

gap which causes the original theoretical
difficulty is
now,

as it were,

availed to other ends.
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CHAPTER IV

REVERBERATIONS AND ASSESSMENTS

A.

Barter:

Barter,

"Need,” Use and Ambi quit

as we will recall,

is cast by Aristotle as

non-excessive exchange form because it
does not rely
upon the mediation of coinage which
a

carries the

potential of transgressive excess.

In the barter

transaction, the dissimilitude in outcome
is not

regarded by Aristotle as dangerous, but as
necessary
and proper, broadly absorbed through the
limits

ascribed by need and nature.

In the barter

transaction, the socially codified quantitative form

providing mediation is replaced by

a

purely

distributive function, and as such, is broadly regarded
as not quantitatively calibrated,

mutual.

but nonetheless

According to Aristotle, although barter is

applicable to pre-political "tribal" associations,

because it is devoid of formal quantitative forms of

measure it is functionally inappropriate to the
acquisitive requirements of political community.
The elements of use and limit associated with

barter are employed by Aristotle to contain the
quantitative expression of exchange, money and
120

exchange value, which possess no
inherent limit.
The
reasoning which directs the employment
of use-value in
the Politics is also that which
makes chreia so
appealing as a solution to Aristotle's
treatment of
exchange in the Ethics. However, as we
proposed,

although chreia and use are employed to
define and
contain transgressive elements of
acquisition, they
themselves harbor a significant ambiguity
which,

subtle,

is not ancillary in its implications.

at the conclusion of Part

if

As posed

Aristotle's analysis in

I,

the Ethics associates chreia with a useful
communal
bond.

This bond, however,

is based not on a precise

restitution, but on the adequate or "sufficient"
(hikanos)

accommodation between goods exchanged.

implications of this, as suggested, are

problematical to Aristotle's schema

—

The

quite
the natural and

limited category of "need" is not only incongruent with

Aristotle's idea of particular justice as the equal,
but also poses a disturbing question with regard to the

very underpinnings of political association.
thus exists,

There

in addition to the problems associated

with the quantitative elements of money and exchangevalue,

another difficulty.

A problem, that

is,

which

stems from the fact that the most rudimentary elements
of exchange,

represented by Aristotle as necessary,

natural and limited, reside outside the domain of
121

,

quantitative social representation.

The oblique

inadequacies of purely qualitative or
subjective
elements to social representation, as
associated with
use or chreia, are, indeed, the very
reasons nominal
forms of codification and regulation
were initially set
in place in order that the material
relations
of the

polis could be commonly apprehended and
mediated.
The barter form,

as an expression of the denial of

"the objectivity of commodity exchange,"
encloses these

elements by shielding them from collective
observation.
As Mar,, has phrased it, barter is an "elementary
or

accidental form of the expression of value." 236

It is

this space of arbitrary or "accidental" value which

Aristotle attempts to theorize and clearly demarcate
with the notions of use, need and nature, notions
which,

as we said,

limit.

for Aristotle,

contain their own

This sphere related to acquisition, existing

outside social, quantifiable representation, is one in

which not only the concept of chreia, but other related
notions,

such as ophelio , ameinon and sumpheronti

positioned to instruct and condition.
however,

are

Such notions,

inevitably lose their way -- for neither money

236 Marx, Capital, vol. I, pp. 48-49. Also see David
Levine, Economic Theory , Volume One: The Elementary
Relations of Economic Life (Boston: Routledge and Kegan
Paul, 1977), pp. 111-112.
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nor

nature

can fully define this realm.

Smith,

however,

appropriates this "accidental" space
quite
differently; by rendering it, one
may say, even more
accidental.
That this is so may be attributed
to
Smith’s complete effacement of the
forms which
Aristotle used in attempts to configure
or represent
the random elements of this exchange
sphere.
Therefore, although for both the Physiocrats
and Smith,
wealth is understood to be constituted
by tangible
goods.

Smith dismisses use-value en toto.

dispatched in

a

It is

few lines at the end of chapter four:

The word VALUE, it is to be observed, has two
different meanings, and sometimes expresses the
utiiity of some particular object, and sometimes
the possibility of purchasing other goods which the
possession of that object conveys. The one may be
called 'value in use’; the other, 'value in
exchange.' The things which have the greatest value
in use frequently have little or no value in
exchange; and on the contrary, those which
have the greatest value in exchange have frequently
little or no value in use. 238
Thus,

after utilizing all connotation associated with

this notion in chapter two. Smith formally expels the
237

That is, in direct opposition to the mercantilist
emphasis on money as the representative of wealth.
238
"Nothing is more useful than water: but it will
purchase scarce anything; scarce anything can be had in
exchange for it. A diamond on the contrary, has scarce
any value in use; but a very great quantity of other
goods may frequently be had in exchange for it."
Wealth of Nations, pp. 32-33).
See also Cannan's
footnote on p. 33.
(
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classical content of "use" from
his schema by chapter
four."
The arbitrary or "accidental"
elements
'

harbored with the "beneficial" and
mutual relation of
exchange are now more fully exposed.
Smith

simultaneously exploits and constitutes
the nonquantitative phenomena, while extirpating

the elements

which were used by Aristotle to limit
exchange-value.
Here,

the conditions of possibility of an

exchangibility not of matter, but of
self-interest, may
occur.

This is to have a subtle but powerful
influence

upon the reconstitution of this "arbitrary"
space

existing outside of the realm of quantitative
gain.

B.

The "Adam Smith Problem"

The ambiguity of the exchange transaction, and the

modern economic turn it assumes in Smith's Wealth of
Nations via the collapse of Aristotle's metaphysical
imperative, necessarily conditions the topography of

Smithean scholarship.

This is most patently true for

the longest running and most contentious debate issuing

from the Wealth of Nations.

239 Despite this formal dismissal of use, Smith's
choice of language throughout the remainder of the work
is nonetheless punctuated with analogous words such as
"necessity." Such mention, of course, is always found
mixed with acquisitive opening leading beyond mere
sustenance, such as "conveniency" or "occasion."
124

,

.

.

In the nineteenth-century,

the emergence of "das

Adam Smith Probleme" among German
scholars inaugurated
a controversy revolving
around the relationship between
the presence of self-interest as associated with
2

the

Wealth of Nations and the sympathy
and benevolence
found in the Theory of Moral Sentiments 241
,

The

contention over the reconciliation of
sympathy and
self-interest in Smith’s work is a f
ist-to-cuf f s over
subject which, as placed in the context

a

of the intent

of the Wealth of Nations at large,

is relatively puny:

the issue revolves not around the
character of "mutual

opulence," but the affect and intent of the
transacting
subject.
This focus sidesteps Smith’s significant
240

The Wealth of Nations as Max Lerner writes,
is
founded on the bedrock" of self-interest.
(Introduction, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes
of
the Wealth of Nations, ed. Edwin Cannan [New
York:
Modern Library, 1937], p. ix)
And, as Robert H. Frank
remarks,
the modern behavioral scientists' focus on
self-interest traces directly back to Adam Smith."
{Passions Within Reason [New York: Norton, 1988],
p.
21).
Such an interpretation of the Wealth of Nations
is widely regarded as the basis of the Chicago
School,
most notably represented by George Stigler and Milton
Friedman, as well as rational choice theory.
241
For an overview of some of the key issues see
Richard Teichgraeber, "Rethinking the Adam Smith
Problem," Journal of British Studies 20 (Spring 1981).
The most significant attempt to broach the apparent
divergence between the two works is found in A.L
Macfie's The Individual in Society: Papers on Adam
Smith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1967)
Jacob
Viner's seminal article, "Adam Smith and Laissez
Faire,"
Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 35 [April
1927], pp. 198-232), is, to the contrary, an enduring
example of the case against a reconciliation between
the two works.
(
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,

novation

the displacement of gain
from the

immediate exchange form,

a

displacement which opens a

space by which "material"
exchange, as now expunged
of
the issue of value-in-exchange,
may be loaded up with
all manner of qualitative
forms.
In this sense, Smith

simultaneously creates the conditions
for, and the
solution to "the Adam Smith Problem." 242
,

One of the more striking
approaches to forging
"reconciliation" between the mutuality
suggested by

a

benevolence and self-interest is found
in the work of
Patricia Werhane. 243 Werhane's goal,
as she phrases it,
242
is to defend the Wealth of Nations
against
those who

charge it with giving "new dignity to
greed and

sanctification to the predatory impulse." 244
243

a

new

Werhane

T hat the stakes of the debate
assume such a pitch
oyer the affective and not on the formally
economic
elements of his work are indicative of the
supplantation of the distributive features of Smith's
244
price-mechanism by neo-classical economic models.

Patricia Werhane, Adam Smith and His Legacy for
Modern Capitalism (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1991), p. 92.
The text will be referred to hereafter
as ASL.
Werhane's argument is a variation of P.L.
Danner s Sympathy and Exchangeable Value: Keys to Adam
Smith's Social Philosophy," Review of Social Economy 34
(1976), pp. 317-331, and Robert Boynton Lamb's "Adam
Smith's System: Sympathy, Not Self-Interest" Journal of
the History of Ideas 35 (1974), pp. 671-682.
Lerner, Introduction, An Inquiry into the Nature
and Causes of the Wealth of Nations p. ix. George
Stack suggests that the view of predominating selfinterest is the one most commonly held in the Smithean
literature.
"Self Interests and Social Value," Journal
of Value Inquiry 18 (1984), pp. 123-137.
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seeks,

in turn,

to expose elements in the
Wealth which

are in accord with the
benevolence and sympathy of the
Theory of Moral Sentiments

Werhane begins her appraisal with
the observation
that in the Wealth of Nations
the term ''self-interest"
appears usually in the context of
"individual economic
exchanges," and directs our attention
to the "single
exchange transaction" portrayed in
the butcher-baker

passage in chapter two of the Wealth. 245
Is of special import,

This passage

as she tells us, because it is

commonly used in defense of the thesis
that "selfinterest ... is the dominant motivating force

in the

Wealth of Nations

.

According to Werhane, although

self-interests "appear to dominate" in the butcherbaker passage, cooperation is "both natural
and
essential.

1,

24

7

in support of this effort to draw out

elements of "mutual and cooperative" elements in the
Wealth of Nations, Werhane cites,

first,

the "non-

adversarial" nature of exchange, and by way of
emphasis, directs our attention to the role played by

persuasion in the butcher-baker scenario.

Next,

Werhane cites Smith's examples of the distributive
function of commercial exchange
245

Werhane, ASL, p. 92.

246

Werhane, ASL, p. 92.

247

Werhane, ASL, p. 94.
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—

such as relations

.

between city and country by
which cities provide the
country with finished
manufactures and the country
provides the city with raw
materials. 248 The result"both thus gain from such.
.mutually advantageous
"
249
arrangements
.

.

Given the presence of cooperation
within the
purportedly self-advantaging exchange
transaction, the
"best" definition of self-interest,
Werhane
concludes,

is that of Lionel Robbins who
renders self-interest not
as selfishness, but as "personal

interest."

Werhane,

after Robbins, describes this
"personal interest" as
only the interests of the individual
concerned in the

matters with which he is most intimately
concerned." 250
This definition gives forceful expression
to the

distance between the modern and the classical

understanding of self-advantaging

—

dangerous

precisely to the extent that it enacts an encroachment
upon another

.

As we have seen, this maneuver was

248

Werhane, ASL, p. 94.

249

Werhane, ASL, p. 94.

250

Werhane, ASL, p. 89.
Robbins is quoted from his
Political Economy: Past and Present, Vol. 1 (London: G
Routledge & Sons, 1946), p. 180.
251

For this reason, the choice of some modern
translators to use the phrase "self-interest" to
translate pleonexia is
less than optimal.
For a
succinct example of the modern conception, see for
example, the fourth chapter of Eric Fromm’s Man for
Himself: An Inquiry Into the Psychology of Ethics (New
York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1966)
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effected by Smith's transactable
self-interested
subject.
In Werhane's instance,
however,

the logic

Which conditions and limits
Smith's transacting subject
IS pressed further through
the positing of sphere
of

autonomy for the self-interested
subject.
In this
realm of privacy, self-interest,
in any conceivable
form,

is not so much redefined as
sheltered by a zone

which absorbs both motives and ends
of self-interest.
As such, the "personal concerns"
which make up selfinterest are made to occupy an unassailable

bastion, a

neutral sphere preserved from the rigors
of
representation.

ostensive goal

By way of one comparison, the
(and foil)

of the transaction in Smith's

account of the encounter between the butcher
and the
baker is the procurement of mutton; in Werhane's
account,

this tangible object gives way to "concerns"

which are ineffable.

(And,

if this is not sufficiently

impervious to scrutiny, one may be repelled simply
by
the vague prurience of "intimate" concerns.

A primary discrepancy

is thus presented.

Werhane

asserts the self-interested subject on the one hand, as
a

cooperative, exchanging being.

hand,
a

Yet,

on the other

this self-same subject is presented as occupying

sovereign sphere. 252

That this sphere of private

252
Werhane's obliviousness to this fundamental
discrepancy in her argument is staggering. The
confusion which ensues from the employment of an
129

f

.

interest is truly impermeable
is indicated by the
inclusion among "personal"
concerns not only the

obligatory Smithean categories
of "self-betterment" and
"approval-seeking" but Werhane 's highly
peculiar
catch-

all

for the demands,

actual or conceptual, of

mtersubjectivity: "intimate social
interests." 253
this distention of the notion of
privacy,

in

the self-

sufficient autotelic subject coopts
its negation and
limit, the "social," within its
own inscrutable
confines
Given that the point which Werhane
sets about to
establish is the essential role of
cooperation in the
Wealth,

this argument crafts a curious train
of events.

At the root of the tension in Werhane'

s

account between

"cooperation" and an autonomous realm of "intimacy"
is
a

fundamental deviation from Smith's argument.

As we

will recall, early in the discussion Werhane
locates
se ^ - i n terest in the realm of "appearances" while

positing cooperation as the underlying element of the
transaction: although self-interests do "appear to

dominate" cooperation is "both natural and

autotelic self-interest to organize an argument which
is purportedly based on cooperation produces strange
results.
Nonetheless, in one instance we find Werhane
proclaiming that "economic exchanges cannot operate in
the vacuum of self-interest."
(Werhane, ASL, p. 89).
253

Werhane, ASL

f

p.

95.

(italics added.)
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essential

" 254

will argue that this

I

.

appearance/essence split is central
to the significance
of Werhane 's conception of
"self-interest."
Werhane

impulse (at least in the portion
of her
argument that treats the issue of
cooperation)
tries
to argue from the position
that the defense
'

s

,

of the

Wealth must consist of drawing
these "essential"
elements to the surface. As Werhane
ventures: "I will
suggest that it is the desire to
cooperate which drives
the impulse to exchange." 255 Smith,
as we will recall,
does not assert cooperation as the
impulse which drives
exchange.
Instead, it is an obtuse "propensity"
which
serves as the founding impulse to "truck,
barter, and
exchange " 256 This is to say, for Smith,
the impulse to
.

exchange is ultimately founded upon

a

sub-rational

process.
To attempt,

as does Werhane,

to draw cooperation

to the level of transactive appearances and

intent ionality,

is anathema to the requirements of

Smith's project.

254

At one end of the schema,

the

Werhane, ASL, p. 94.

255 Werhane,

ASL,

p.

95.

Although arguing that "our natural desire to
cooperate motivates us to barter with other
individuals, " the order of such originary impulses is
elsewhere inverted: "I suggest that it is the natural
interest in trading with others that triggers such
cooperation." (Werhane, ASL, p. 92).
256
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mtentionless "propensity" founding
the exchange
transaction permits the free-rein
of self-interest
("appearances"), to emerge in a
two-fold outcome:
materially, as profit, and
ideologically as "common
advantage."

The outcome of the Smithean
process,

the vantage point of the
individual,

from

is that of

Goethe's Mephistopheles, unintended
and unforeseen. As
Smith tells us in the famous phrase,
the individual is
often deceived,
led as it were by an invisible
hand"
to contribute toward a greater
good. 257
The negation of the centrality of
unintended

social outcomes resulting from intentional
acts of

self-advantaging to the structure of Smith's
argument
is here negated by Werhane, whose
effort to reconcile
appearance and essence appears, at this moment,
somewhat Aristotelian.

As such, Werhane 's attempt to

reconcile appearance qua self-interest and essence
qua
cooperation, may be also phrased as the effort to unify
these two aspects within the single exchange
transaction.

Because Werhane denies both the space of deferral
and subsequently the location of the excessive
remainder,

she may be said to be working exclusively

257
See in particular Book III of the Wealth.
Compare
also to Part IV, chapter 1 of The Theory of Moral
Sentiments with regard to being "led by an invisible
hand.
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from the first portion
of the Wealth of Nations.
However, because Werhane's
account, unlike Smith's,
does not posit a space
for deferral, the
sanctimonious
motif leads into a corner:
because of the rife
mutuality and cooperation,
not only is there no
place
for the very intention
to profit from another,
but
there is no place for
individual profit altogether.
Werhane's strict protection of
a benign self-interest
creates an untenable argument
in which efforts to
construct an autonomous non-encroaching
subject
foreclose on the potential for
gain en toto.
Here, the

classical anxiety associated with
exchange has taken
new, and exceedingly strange,
turn.

Werhane's argument,

a

a

distillation of the first

portion of the Wealth of Nations is
,

a

symptom of the

broader naturalization of the ideological
origins of
laissez-faire economics.
This naturalization

evinces

the omission of the quantitative second
portion of the
work,

the portion where individual gain occurs,

as well

as Smith's often acrimonious commentaries
with regard
to the capitalist desire for
is,

indeed,

(excessive) profit.

It

the very success of Smith's innovation that

permits such naturalization,
as suggested,

a

naturalization which is,

at the root of the "Adam Smith Problem"

-- as well as the source of many of
its purported

solutions

133

Because of this naturalization,

a

curious paradox

ensues: on one hand, Werhane
exists in a post-Smithean
world in which profit and
individual gain are already
largely absorbed by a deferral
into the market
structure.
However, because of the perceived
need to
defend Smith
or rather, to moralize
self-interest

Werhane

's

own solution, which

both distills and

distorts Smith's position, casts her
back to a preSmithean stage of transactive anxiety
in which profit
is fugitive and transactivity
itself raises a threat. 258
Werhane' s omission of the role of
deferral in Smith's
system,

as a means to moralize the acquisitive
impulses

which drive the market, thus tampers with
the
structural positioning of profit as morally
neutral.
In the end,

the opposition between the autonomous
and

morally righteous subject marks the impossibility
of an
absolute gain, while the ideological gap
which

—

Werhane is trying to close -- necessitates it.

258
In a related vein, Werhane' s "defense" of Smith,
arguably, could be protective of a dimly perceived
fissure in the ideological logic, one which would
creates the impulse for a wholesale purging of all
vestiges of the unseemly affect of "self-interest."
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C.

Conclusion

The exchange form poses
a problem to theoretical
attempts to represent political
community.
By tracing
the Aristotelian and early
modern genealogy of the
problem and the concomitant attempts
at resolution, we
saw that for Aristotle the
first approach to the
problem was to attempt an equalization
of the exchange
transaction, and the second, to
separate the dangerous
and proper forms of exchange.
According to Aristotle's
schema, the proper, "beneficial"
form is associated
most unambiguously with barter and
"use," while the
second,

as a potentially adventitious form
of pecuniary

gain is associated with exchange-value
and the

politico-social necessity of money.

However,

in the

final instance, Aristotle is unable to
maintain a

distinction between

a

proper or limited form of

exchange and an instance of excess.
impulse to resolve the ambiguity of the money-

mediated exchange transaction by cordoning off the
gainful from the beneficial was given an often

ingenious expression by the mercantilists who defined

mutual and dangerous forms of exchange in terms of the

boundaries of the nation-state: that

is,

the ambiguity

surrounding exchange was "solved" by ejecting material
135

advantage

-

profit

-

from the domestic economy
and

into the agonistic international
scene.

physiocrats,

in turn,

The

although responsible for laying

the foundation for the
theoretical shift from exchange
to production as the source
of gain, could not contend
fully with the errant elements
of exchange
which in
the final instance were attributed
to the guile of the
merchant class.

—

The Wealth of Nations marks the
ideological

resolution of the classical difficulties
associated
with exchange
and thus the issue of material

distribution in

a

community

—

through

a

transmogrification of the exchange transaction.

The

work at hand has delineated three
representations of
exchange in the Wealth of Nations, each of
which are

distributive and/or non-quantitative

.

First,

Smith's

narratives of exchange as spontaneous circulation
and
distribution, as found in the account of the division
of labor; second,

the infamous butcher-baker mise-en-

scene which omits the possibility of individual

pecuniary gain while shifting exchange onto

a

meta-

economic level; and third, the use of the barter form
in order to effect the only successful expression of

the labor theory of value.
show,

As

I

have attempted to

in the first portion of the Wealth of Nations

these usages perform, under the organizing aegis of
136
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production, a separation between
individual economic
exchange and quantitative outcome;
that is, severing
the very possibility of gain
from the individual
"economic sphere" as represented
by the single exchange
transaction.
As suggested, the logic associated
with the barter
form of exchange serves two
purposes: first, as a means
of formal distribution, it offers
a non-adventitious

expression of exchange that creates

a

sphere wherein

the imprecisions endemic to the
relation between

exchange-value and quantitative individual
gain are
absorbed.
Second, the shift from a focus
on the

matter transacted to

a

transactablility of two self-

seeking subjects, creates

pseudo-economic modality of

a

exchange removed from the thorny issues associated
with

quantitative gain.

As such,

the omission of socially

quantifiable elements permit an ordering of the

machinations associated with the "excessive remainder"
in accord with the matrix of substitution conferred
by

the mechanistic notion of exchange.

The atavisms of

the barter form which permit this pseudo-economic

reemergence of exchange as pure transactivity marks
both the genealogy and the essence of laissez-faire
economics

-- and as such,

the ground of neo-liberal

discourse

137

As has been argued,

Wealth of Nations

,

in the first portion
of the

the omission of
quantitative

elements serves to suspend
the difficulties associated
with exchange-value and the
attendant issues of equal
exchange. As such. Smith’s
account in the first

portion of the work forestalls
the issue of actual
material advantage until this
alternative to single
advantage is introduced, whereby
a contained and
legitimized form of individual
advantage
"profit"
ruptures the mutual abundance created
by the division
of labor.
Transposing the moment of gain from

—

-

the

single transaction to a macro level
releases the single
transaction from the onus of immediate
fairness, while
placing it under the formal aegis of
the price

mechanism provides the analytical and
structural
supplement for the rhetorical maneuvers of

the first

portion of the work.
Within the matrix afforded by production,
the new
conception of profit allows a potentially dangerous

pecuniary "surplus" to be contained.

purified in such

a manner,

When systemically

the moment of individual

advantage that was once regarded as dangerous to the
community, becomes an occasion for gain hitherto
absent.

This is to say, Smith forges an accommodation

of the paradigms of mutual benefit and individual

advantage that Aristotle, the Mercantilists and the
138

Physiocrats struggled to
separate.
By means of such a
combination of "mutuality"
and gain. Smith reascribes
the exchange form in the
single version as qualitative
in one sense, and as
purely formal in a second.
By

thus driving a

wedge between quantitative
and

qualitative forms. Smith's account
may be likewise
apprehended as the economic
expression of Hume's
undermining of the classical
categories of metaphysics

Smith's innovation presents

a

solution to the

ambiguity lodged in Aristotle's
accounts of exchange;
namely, by redefining the
adventitiousness which
in

Aristotle's account appeared as

a

repressed element

existing at the very foundation of the
polis.

In the

Politics, Aristotle's assessment of the
various

exchange forms suggested something quite
disturbing:

because the modality of exchange creates

a

remainder

which can not be theoretically contained nor

organically accounted for, the acquisitive ends of
the
citizen could not be fully distinguished from those
of
the merchant, who trades expressly for the sake of
gain.

Smith's innovation permits the voiding of any

dangers associated with this ambiguity.
as we are told,

merchant
259

"every man... becomes in some measure a

" 259
.

Smith,

Instead, now,

Wealth of Nations, p. 26.
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